# 1NC

### States CP

#### The fifty states and all relevant territories should substantially increase prohibitions on anticompetitive business practices by the private sector by at least expanding the scope of their core antitrust laws by interpreting profit as an anticompetitive business practice.

#### States can pursue autonomous anti-trust enforcement even when conflicting with federal law.

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At the federal level, the U.S. antitrust laws—including the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act, which governs mergers and acquisitions—are enforced by the FTC and DOJ. States also have antitrust laws, which are enforced by state AGs and are often patterned after their federal analogs, but can contain important differences. States frequently collaborate with the federal antitrust agencies and/or other states on merger investigations. However, the Supreme Court has recognized that states are not required to do so, and have the right to make enforcement decisions that differ from other federal and state authorities.[[3]](https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/trends-in-state-antitrust-enforcement-42950/#_ftn3) States have sometimes exercised this authority in order to “fill the gap” of perceived under-enforcement at the federal level. For example, in June 2017, the California AG sued to block Valero Energy Partners LP’s acquisition of two petroleum terminals in Northern California, despite the FTC’s decision not to challenge the deal. Several months later, the parties abandoned the transaction. More broadly, in recent years, there has been a growing trend of robust and autonomous state antitrust enforcement, as illustrated by major investigations and enforcement actions by state coalitions in the healthcare, pharmaceutical, telecom, and technology sectors, among others. Consistent with this trend, Colorado AG Phil Weiser—who previously served as Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the DOJ Antitrust Division under the Obama administration—has affirmed his commitment to “protecting all Coloradans from anticompetitive consolidation and practices…whether or not the federal government acts to protect Coloradans.” In keeping with this mandate, the Amendment will bring Colorado increasingly in line with states such as California and New York that have demonstrated an appetite for aggressive, independent antitrust enforcement, even where it may depart (or conflict) with federal action.

### Politics DA

#### Will pass now- Biden pressure and timing key

Shannon Pettypiece, 10-14-2021, "White House pushing Congress to reach deal on spending bill soon," NBC News, https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/white-house-pushing-congress-reach-spending-bill-deal-soon-n1281567

White House officials are signaling to Congress that the time is running short for negotiations over President Joe Biden's infrastructure and social spending packages and that they want a deal to get done quickly.

A person familiar with the White House's thinking said that while Biden believes good progress has been made in negotiations, he thinks it is crucial to pass the bills soon, and officials are pushing members to do so.

White House press secretary Jen Psaki said Thursday, "The time for negotiations is not unending, and we are eager to move forward, we are eager to deliver on what he promised to the American people." She said that the White House wasn't setting any deadlines but that "it is time to move forward with negotiations."

#### Antitrust reform requires PC and trades off with other legislative priorities.

Peter C. Carstensen 21, the Fred W. & Vi Miller Chair in Law Emeritus, University of Wisconsin Law School, February 2021, “THE “OUGHT” AND “IS LIKELY” OF BIDEN ANTITRUST,” https://www.concurrences.com/en/review/issues/no-1-2021/on-topic/the-new-us-antitrust-administration-en

14. Similarly, despite bipartisan murmurs about competitive issues, the potential in a closely divided Congress that any major initiatives will survive is limited at best. In part the challenge here is how the Biden administration will rank its commitments. If it were to make reform of competition law a major and primary commitment, it would have to trade off other goals, which might include health care reform or increases in the minimum wage. It is likely in this circumstance the new administration, like the Obama administration’s abandonment of the pro-competitive rules proposed under the PSA, would elect to give up stricter competition rules in order to achieve other legislative priorities.

15. Another key to a robust commitment to workable competition is the choice of cabinet and other key administrative positions. Here as well, the early signs are not entirely encouraging. In selecting Tom Vilsack to return as secretary of agriculture, the president has embraced a friend of the large corporate interests dominating agriculture who has spent the last four years in a highly lucrative position advancing their interests. Given the desperate need for pro-competitive rules to implement the PSA and control exploitation of dairy farmers through milk-market orders, the return of Vilsack is not good news. Who will head the FTC and who will be the attorney general and assistant attorney general for antitrust is still unknown, but if those picks are also centrists with strong links to corporate America the hope for robust enforcement of competition law will further attenuate!

16. In sum, this is a pessimistic prognostication for the likely Biden antitrust enforcement agenda. There is much that ought to be done. But this requires a willingness to take major enforcement risks, to invest significant political capital in the legislative process, and to select leaders who are committed to advancing the public interest in fair, efficient and dynamically competitive markets. The early signs are that the new administration will be no more committed to robust competition policy than the Obama administration. Events may force a more vigorous policy—I will cling to that hope as the Biden administration takes shape.

#### Infrastructure bill key to cyber security

Cat Zakrzewski, 8-14-2021, "The Senate’s $1 trillion infrastructure bill includes funding to secure Americans’ water systems and power grids from cyberattacks," https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/08/14/cybersecurity-infrastructure-senate-legislation/

A Senate bill intended to shore up the nation’s roads, pipes and electric grid includes billions to protect that aging infrastructure from cyberattacks.

With a series of high-profile ransomware attacks fresh in their minds, U.S. Senate negotiators wove cybersecurity investments throughout the bipartisan $1 trillion infrastructure proposal, which passed the Senate in a 69-to-30 vote on Tuesday and now moves to the House for a vote. The allocations are a reflection of the growing realization in Congress that a computer attack could leave Americans without water, power or other essentials.

“This is an incredibly serious threat to this country that’s only growing more serious,” said Sen. Angus King (I-Maine).

The Colonial Pipeline ransomware attack in May was a wake-up call that gave lawmakers and the public “a taste of what is potentially in store,” King said. The attack disrupted fuel supplies in the eastern United States, prompting gasoline shortages and panicked buying that affected millions for days.

The Colonial hack was just one in a series of attacks on lawmakers’ minds. King said he is particularly wary of attacks on the more than 100,000 public water systems in the United States, especially after a hacker in February took control of a water treatment facility in Oldsmar, Fla. The intruder raised the levels of sodium hydroxide to a hazardous point that could have sickened residents. An operator noticed the rising levels and was able to quickly intervene, but the incident highlighted the broader weaknesses at the facilities responsible for ensuring Americans have clean drinking water.

To King, one of the Senate negotiators, these incidents underlined that cybersecurity has to be a part of any work the government does on infrastructure, from broadband to power grids.

The bill directs the Federal Highway Administration to create a new tool to help transportation authorities better detect and respond to cyber attacks, which could range from ransomware attacks on transportation departments or hacks of traffic lights and road signs. It makes emergency funding available to respond to digital attacks on public water systems and makes grants available that can be used to help some water systems increase their ability to deal with cyberattacks as well as natural hazards and extreme weather.

It also calls on the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to develop incentives to ensure that electric utilities are investing in cybersecurity and sharing data about potential threats.

The bill also authorizes nearly $2 billion in spending for specific cybersecurity initiatives, such as the creation of a $1 billion grant program to provide federal cybersecurity assistance to state and local governments, which experts say are among the most vulnerable institutions to ransomware attacks. The bill also would fund a new cyber director office, so that the federal government can better coordinate its response to major hacks, and would create a $100 million response and recovery fund, which the Department of Homeland Security could use to support both private companies and governments’ recoveries from cyberattacks.

The infusion of funding follows years of warnings from across the federal government of the vulnerability of U.S. critical infrastructure to cyberattacks. A year ago, the National Security Agency and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency warned that critical infrastructure systems, including energy, transportation and water systems, make “attractive targets for foreign powers attempting to do harm to U.S. interests or retaliate for perceived U.S. aggression.”

#### Cyberattacks go nuclear.

Michael T. Klare 19. Professor emeritus of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College and senior visiting fellow at the Arms Control Association. “Cyber Battles, Nuclear Outcomes? Dangerous New Pathways to Escalation.” https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-11/features/cyber-battles-nuclear-outcomes-dangerous-new-pathways-escalation

Another initiative incorporated in the strategy document also aroused concern: the claim that an enemy cyberattack on U.S. nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) facilities would constitute a “non-nuclear strategic attack” of sufficient magnitude to justify the use of nuclear weapons in response.

Under the Obama administration’s NPR report, released in April 2010, the circumstances under which the United States would consider responding to non-nuclear attacks with nuclear weapons were said to be few. “The United States will continue to…reduce the role of nuclear weapons in deterring non-nuclear attacks,” the report stated. Although little was said about what sort of non-nuclear attacks might be deemed severe enough to justify a nuclear response, cyberstrikes were not identified as one of these. The 2018 NPR report, however, portrayed a very different environment, one in which nuclear combat is seen as increasingly possible and in which non-nuclear strategic threats, especially in cyberspace, were viewed as sufficiently menacing to justify a nuclear response. Speaking of Russian technological progress, for example, the draft version of the Trump administration’s NPR report stated, “To…correct any Russian misperceptions of advantage, the president will have an expanding range of limited and graduated [nuclear] options to credibly deter Russian nuclear or non-nuclear strategic attacks, which could now include attacks against U.S. NC3, in space and cyberspace.”1

The notion that a cyberattack on U.S. digital systems, even those used for nuclear weapons, would constitute sufficient grounds to launch a nuclear attack was seen by many observers as a dangerous shift in policy, greatly increasing the risk of accidental or inadvertent nuclear escalation in a crisis. “The entire broadening of the landscape for nuclear deterrence is a very fundamental step in the wrong direction,” said former Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz. “I think the idea of nuclear deterrence of cyberattacks, broadly, certainly does not make any sense.”2

Despite such admonitions, the Pentagon reaffirmed its views on the links between cyberattacks and nuclear weapons use when it released the final version of the NPR report in February 2018. The official text now states that the president must possess a spectrum of nuclear weapons with which to respond to “attacks against U.S. NC3,” and it identifies cyberattacks as one form of non-nuclear strategic warfare that could trigger a nuclear response.

That cyberwarfare had risen to this level of threat, the 2018 NPR report indicated, was a product of the enhanced cybercapabilities of potential adversaries and of the creeping obsolescence of many existing U.S. NC3 systems. To overcome these vulnerabilities, it called for substantial investment in an upgraded NC3 infrastructure. Not mentioned, however, were extensive U.S. efforts to employ cybertools to infiltrate and potentially incapacitate the NC3 systems of likely adversaries, including Russia, China, and North Korea.

For the past several years, the U.S. Department of Defense has been exploring how it could employ its own very robust cyberattack capabilities to compromise or destroy enemy missiles from such states as North Korea before they can be fired, a strategy sometimes called “left of launch.”3 Russia and China can assume, on this basis, that their own launch facilities are being probed for such vulnerabilities, presumably leading them to adopt escalatory policies such as those espoused in the 2018 NPR report. Wherever one looks, therefore, the links between cyberwar and nuclear war are growing.

The Nuclear-Cyber Connection

These links exist because the NC3 systems of the United States and other nuclear-armed states are heavily dependent on computers and other digital processors for virtually every aspect of their operation and because those systems are highly vulnerable to cyberattack. Every nuclear force is composed, most basically, of weapons, early-warning radars, launch facilities, and the top officials, usually presidents or prime ministers, empowered to initiate a nuclear exchange. Connecting them all, however, is an extended network of communications and data-processing systems, all reliant on cyberspace. Warning systems, ground- and space-based, must constantly watch for and analyze possible enemy missile launches. Data on actual threats must rapidly be communicated to decision-makers, who must then weigh possible responses and communicate chosen outcomes to launch facilities, which in turn must provide attack vectors to delivery systems. All of this involves operations in cyberspace, and it is in this domain that great power rivals seek vulnerabilities to exploit in a constant struggle for advantage.

The use of cyberspace to gain an advantage over adversaries takes many forms and is not always aimed at nuclear systems. China has been accused of engaging in widespread cyberespionage to steal technical secrets from U.S. firms for economic and military advantages. Russia has been accused, most extensively in the Robert Mueller report, of exploiting cyberspace to interfere in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Nonstate actors, including terrorist groups such as al Qaeda and the Islamic State group, have used the internet for recruiting combatants and spreading fear. Criminal groups, including some thought to be allied with state actors, such as North Korea, have used cyberspace to extort money from banks, municipalities, and individuals.4 Attacks such as these occupy most of the time and attention of civilian and military cybersecurity organizations that attempt to thwart such attacks. Yet for those who worry about strategic stability and the risks of nuclear escalation, it is the threat of cyberattacks on NC3 systems that provokes the greatest concern.

This concern stems from the fact that, despite the immense effort devoted to protecting NC3 systems from cyberattack, no enterprise that relies so extensively on computers and cyberspace can be made 100 percent invulnerable to attack. This is so because such systems employ many devices and operating systems of various origins and vintages, most incorporating numerous software updates and “patches” over time, offering multiple vectors for attack. Electronic components can also be modified by hostile actors during production, transit, or insertion; and the whole system itself is dependent to a considerable degree on the electrical grid, which itself is vulnerable to cyberattack and is far less protected. Experienced “cyberwarriors” of every major power have been working for years to probe for weaknesses in these systems and in many cases have devised cyberweapons, typically, malicious software (malware) and computer viruses, to exploit those weaknesses for military advantage.5

Although activity in cyberspace is much more difficult to detect and track than conventional military operations, enough information has become public to indicate that the major nuclear powers, notably China, Russia, and the United States, along with such secondary powers as Iran and North Korea, have established extensive cyberwarfare capabilities and engage in offensive cyberoperations on a regular basis, often aimed at critical military infrastructure. “Cyberspace is a contested environment where we are in constant contact with adversaries,” General Paul M. Nakasone, commander of the U.S. Cyber Command (Cybercom), told the Senate Armed Services Committee in February 2019. “We see near-peer competitors [China and Russia] conducting sustained campaigns below the level of armed conflict to erode American strength and gain strategic advantage.”

Although eager to speak of adversary threats to U.S. interests, Nakasone was noticeably but not surprisingly reluctant to say much about U.S. offensive operations in cyberspace. He acknowledged, however, that Cybercom took such action to disrupt possible Russian interference in the 2018 midterm elections. “We created a persistent presence in cyberspace to monitor adversary actions and crafted tools and tactics to frustrate their efforts,” he testified in February. According to press accounts, this included a cyberattack aimed at paralyzing the Internet Research Agency, a “troll farm” in St. Petersburg said to have been deeply involved in generating disruptive propaganda during the 2016 presidential elections.6

Other press investigations have disclosed two other offensive operations undertaken by the United States. One called “Olympic Games” was intended to disrupt Iran’s drive to increase its uranium-enrichment capacity by sabotaging the centrifuges used in the process by infecting them with the so-called Stuxnet virus. Another left of launch effort was intended to cause malfunctions in North Korean missile tests.7 Although not aimed at either of the U.S. principal nuclear adversaries, those two attacks demonstrated a willingness and capacity to conduct cyberattacks on the nuclear infrastructure of other states.

Efforts by strategic rivals of the United States to infiltrate and eventually degrade U.S. nuclear infrastructure are far less documented but thought to be no less prevalent. Russia, for example, is believed to have planted malware in the U.S. electrical utility grid, possibly with the intent of cutting off the flow of electricity to critical NC3 facilities in the event of a major crisis.8 Indeed, every major power, including the United States, is believed to have crafted cyberweapons aimed at critical NC3 components and to have implanted malware in enemy systems for potential use in some future confrontation.

Pathways to Escalation

Knowing that the NC3 systems of the major powers are constantly being probed for weaknesses and probably infested with malware designed to be activated in a crisis, what does this say about the risks of escalation from a nonkinetic battle, that is, one fought without traditional weaponry, to a kinetic one, at first using conventional weapons and then, potentially, nuclear ones? None of this can be predicted in advance, but those analysts who have studied the subject worry about the emergence of dangerous new pathways for escalation. Indeed, several such scenarios have been identified.9

The first and possibly most dangerous path to escalation would arise from the early use of cyberweapons in a great power crisis to paralyze the vital command, control, and communications capabilities of an adversary, many of which serve nuclear and conventional forces. In the “fog of war” that would naturally ensue from such an encounter, the recipient of such an attack might fear more punishing follow-up kinetic attacks, possibly including the use of nuclear weapons, and, fearing the loss of its own arsenal, launch its weapons immediately. This might occur, for example, in a confrontation between NATO and Russian forces in east and central Europe or between U.S. and Chinese forces in the Asia-Pacific region.

Speaking of a possible confrontation in Europe, for example, James N. Miller Jr. and Richard Fontaine wrote that “both sides would have overwhelming incentives to go early with offensive cyber and counter-space capabilities to negate the other side’s military capabilities or advantages.” If these early attacks succeeded, “it could result in huge military and coercive advantage for the attacker.” This might induce the recipient of such attacks to back down, affording its rival a major victory at very low cost. Alternatively, however, the recipient might view the attacks on its critical command, control, and communications infrastructure as the prelude to a full-scale attack aimed at neutralizing its nuclear capabilities and choose to strike first. “It is worth considering,” Miller and Fontaine concluded, “how even a very limited attack or incident could set both sides on a slippery slope to rapid escalation.”10

What makes the insertion of latent malware in an adversary’s NC3 systems so dangerous is that it may not even need to be activated to increase the risk of nuclear escalation. If a nuclear-armed state comes to believe that its critical systems are infested with enemy malware, its leaders might not trust the information provided by its early-warning systems in a crisis and might misconstrue the nature of an enemy attack, leading them to overreact and possibly launch their nuclear weapons out of fear they are at risk of a preemptive strike.

“The uncertainty caused by the unique character of a cyber threat could jeopardize the credibility of the nuclear deterrent and undermine strategic stability in ways that advances in nuclear and conventional weapons do not,” Page O. Stoutland and Samantha Pitts-Kiefer wrote in 2018 paper for the Nuclear Threat Initiative. “[T]he introduction of a flaw or malicious code into nuclear weapons through the supply chain that compromises the effectiveness of those weapons could lead to a lack of confidence in the nuclear deterrent,” undermining strategic stability.11 Without confidence in the reliability of its nuclear weapons infrastructure, a nuclear-armed state may misinterpret confusing signals from its early-warning systems and, fearing the worst, launch its own nuclear weapons rather than lose them to an enemy’s first strike. This makes the scenario proffered in the 2018 NPR report, of a nuclear response to an enemy cyberattack, that much more alarming.

### Regs CP

#### Through non-antitrust regulations, the United States federal government should adopt policies of:

#### debt cancellation

#### negative interest rates

#### environmental conservation through shift of taxation onto property and resources

#### taxation of pollution

#### redistribution of wealth

#### degrowth

#### a decentralized internet

#### The counterplan PICs out of anti-trust legislation and the FTC and DOJ as enforcers---other agencies’ regulations solve.

Lawrence Fullerton et al. 08. Joel M Mitnick, William V Reiss, George C Karamanos and Owen H Smith. Sidley Austin LLP. Vertical Agreements The regulation of distribution practices in 34 jurisdictions worldwide. “United States.” https://www.sidley.com/-/media/files/publications/2008/03/getting-the-deal-through--vertical-agreements-2008/files/view-united-states-chapter/fileattachment/united-states-21.pdf

5 What entity or agency is responsible for enforcing prohibitions on anticompetitive vertical restraints? Do governments or ministers have a role?

The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice (DoJ) are the two federal agencies responsible for the enforcement of federal antitrust laws. The FTC and the DoJ have jurisdiction to investigate many of the same types of conduct, and therefore have adopted a clearance procedure pursuant to which matters are handled by whichever agency has the most expertise in a particular area.

Additionally, other agencies, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission and Federal Communications Commission, maintain oversight authority over regulated industries pursuant to various federal statutes, and therefore may review vertical restraints for anti-competitive effects.

### Tradeoff DA

#### FTC’s increasing enforcement in privacy now---it’s focused on algorithmic bias.

James V. Fazio 21. Special counsel in the Intellectual Property Practice Group at Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP, with Liisa M. Thomas, 3/11. “What Is FTC’s Course Under Biden?” https://www.natlawreview.com/article/what-ftc-s-course-under-biden

The new acting FTC chair, Rebecca Kelly Slaughter, recently signaled that the FTC may increase enforcement and penalties in the privacy and data security realm. Slaughter pointed to several areas of focus for the FTC this year, which companies will want to keep in mind: Notifying Consumers About FTC Allegations: Slaughter referred favorably to two recent cases: (1) the Everalbum biometric settlement from earlier this year (which we wrote about at the time); and (2) the Flo Health settlement over alleged deceptive data sharing practices (which we also wrote about at the time). In drawing on these two cases, Slaughter indicated that in future cases the FTC intends to include as part of any settlement a requirement to notify customers of any FTC allegations. This, she said, would allow consumers to “vote with their feet” and help them decide whether to recommend their services to others. FTC Intent to Plead All Relevant Violations: According to Slaughter, another lesson the FTC is taking from the Flo case is to include in the cases it brings all potentially applicable violations of all relevant privacy-related laws. In the Flo case, Slaughter said the FTC should have pleaded a violation of the Health Breach Notification Rule, which requires that vendors of personal health records notify consumers of data breaches. Focus on Ed Tech and COPPA: Given the explosive growth of education technology during COVID-19, the FTC is conducting an industry sweep of the industry. Related to this, the FTC is reviewing its Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act Rule. This goes beyond the refresh the agency did of their FAQs earlier in the pandemic (which we wrote about at the time). For now, Slaughter reminds companies that parental consent is needed before collecting information online from children under the age of 13. Examination of Health Apps: The FTC will take a closer look at health apps, including telehealth and contact tracing apps, as more and more consumers are relying on such apps to manage their health during the pandemic. Overlap Between Competition and Privacy: Slaughter also indicated that it is worth looking at situations where there may be not only privacy concerns, but antitrust as well. Because the FTC has a dual mission (consumer protection and competition) she notes that it has a “structural advantage” over other regulators in that it can look at these issues, especially since -she states- “many of the largest players in digital markets are as powerful as they are because of the breadth of their access to and control over consumer data.” Racial Equality and AI/Biometrics/Geotracking: Slaughter noted that COVID-19 is exacerbating racial inequities. She pointed to the unequal access to technology, as well as algorithmic discrimination (the idea that discrimination offline becomes embedded into algorithmic system logic). The FTC intends to focus on algorithmic discrimination, as well as on the discrimination potentially embedded into facial recognition technologies. (This mirrors concerns that gave rise to the recent Portland facial recognition law, which we recently wrote about). Finally, Slaughter commented on the use of location data to identify characteristics of Black Lives Matter protesters, and said she is concerned about the misuse of location data to track Americans engaged in constitutionally protected speech. Putting it Into Practice: Companies that operate health apps, that are in the education technology space, or that use algorithms or facial recognition tools will want to keep in mind that these are areas of focus for the FTC. And for everyone, keep in mind that the FTC has indicated it will beef up privacy law penalties and will ask for more notification to injured consumers.

#### Antitrust enforcement saps up FTC resources and personnel, which are finite.

Tara L. Reinhart, et al. 21. \*\*Head of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP’s Antitrust/Competition Group. \*\*Steven C. Sunshine, Co-head of Skadden, Arps, Slat, Meagher & Flom LLP’s Antitrust/Competition Group. \*\*David P. Whales, antitrust lawyer with over 25 years of experience in both private and public sectors. \*\*Julia Y. York, partner at Skadden, Arps, Slat, Meagher & Flom LLP. \*\*Bre Jordan, associate at Skadden, Arps, Slat, Meagher & Flom LLP focusing on antitrust law. “Lina Khan’s Appointment as FTC Chair Reflects Biden Administration’s Aggressive Stance on Antitrust Enforcement.” 6/18/21. https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2021/06/lina-khans-appointment-as-ftc-chair

Second, like all antitrust enforcers, Ms. Khan and the FTC will face resource constraints. Bringing antitrust litigation is an expensive and laborious process, often requiring millions of dollars for expert fees and a large army of FTC staff attorneys and taking many months or even years to accomplish. Typically, the FTC can only litigate a handful of antitrust matters at a time. It seems likely that Congress will provide more funding to the FTC in the current environment, but even with these extra resources, the FTC will still have to pick its cases carefully and cannot challenge every deal or every instance of alleged unlawful conduct.

#### That trades off with the necessary resources for privacy enforcement.

John O. McGinnis\* and Linda Sun\*\* 20. \*George C. Dix Professor, Northwestern University, and Associate-Designate, Wilmer Pickering Hale & Dorr LLP. “Unifying Antitrust Enforcement for the Digital Age.” Northwestern Public Law Research Paper No. 20-20. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=3669087

The FTC needs more resources to adequately address the nation’s growing privacy concerns. Currently, the FTC oversees both consumer protection—encompassing privacy—and antitrust,249 making the FTC the chief federal agency on privacy policy and enforcement250 and the nation’s de-facto privacy agency.251 The agency has long-standing experience in enforcing privacy statutes252 and also has special privacy assets, such as an internet lab capable of high-quality tech forensics to track invasions of privacy.253 The FTC, however, has failed to keep pace with the massive growth of privacy concerns—a phenomenon also driven by modern technology. Very few Americans feel conﬁdent in the privacy of their information in the digital age.254 According to a 2019 study, over 80% of Americans feel that they have little to no control over the data collected on them by companies and the government.255 To adequately address privacy concerns, the FTC needs more resources.256 The agency has been explicit that it needs more manpower to police tech companies. In requesting increased funding from Congress, FTC Director Joseph Simons said the money would allow the agency to hire additional staff and bring more privacy cases.257 A former director of the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection, which houses the privacy unit, has called the FTC “woefully understaffed.”258 As of the spring of 2019, the FTC had only forty employees dedicated to privacy and data security, compared to 500 and 110 employees at comparable agencies in the UK. and Ireland, respectively.259 Without more lawyers, investigators, and technologists, the FTC will be forced to conduct privacy investigations less thoroughly, and in some cases, forgo them altogether.260 Currently, the FTC’s resources are spread thin across multiple missions, to the detriment of its privacy efforts. Removing the agency’s antitrust responsibilities would reallocate resources from the antitrust department to its privacy unit and other areas of consumer protection. Further, it would free up the scarce time of the commissioners to oversee this essential effort.261

#### Unchecked algorithmic bias risks massive inequality and extinction.

Mike Thomas 20. Quoting AI experts including MIT Physics Professors, Senior Features Writer for BuiltIn. THE FUTURE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: 7 ways AI can change the world for better ... or worse, Updated: April 20, 2020, <https://builtin.com/artificial-intelligence/artificial-intelligence-future>

Klabjan also puts little stock in extreme scenarios — the type involving, say, murderous cyborgs that turn the earth into a smoldering hellscape. He’s much more concerned with machines — war robots, for instance — being fed faulty “incentives” by nefarious humans. As MIT physics professors and leading AI researcher Max Tegmark put it in a 2018 TED Talk, “The real threat from AI isn’t malice, like in silly Hollywood movies, but competence — AI accomplishing goals that just aren’t aligned with ours.” That’s Laird’s take, too. “I definitely don’t see the scenario where something wakes up and decides it wants to take over the world,” he says. “I think that’s science fiction and not the way it’s going to play out.” What Laird worries most about isn’t evil AI, per se, but “evil humans using AI as a sort of false force multiplier” for things like bank robbery and credit card fraud, among many other crimes. And so, while he’s often frustrated with the pace of progress, AI’s slow burn may actually be a blessing. “Time to understand what we’re creating and how we’re going to incorporate it into society,” Laird says, “might be exactly what we need.” But no one knows for sure. “There are several major breakthroughs that have to occur, and those could come very quickly,” Russell said during his Westminster talk. Referencing the rapid transformational effect of nuclear fission (atom splitting) by British physicist Ernest Rutherford in 1917, he added, “It’s very, very hard to predict when these conceptual breakthroughs are going to happen.” But whenever they do, if they do, he emphasized the importance of preparation. That means starting or continuing discussions about the ethical use of A.G.I. and whether it should be regulated. That means working to eliminate data bias, which has a corrupting effect on algorithms and is currently a fat fly in the AI ointment. That means working to invent and augment security measures capable of keeping the technology in check. And it means having the humility to realize that just because we can doesn’t mean we should. “Our situation with technology is complicated, but the big picture is rather simple,” Tegmark said during his TED Talk. “Most AGI researchers expect AGI within decades, and if we just bumble into this unprepared, it will probably be the biggest mistake in human history. It could enable brutal global dictatorship with unprecedented inequality, surveillance, suffering and maybe even human extinction. But if we steer carefully, we could end up in a fantastic future where everybody’s better off—the poor are richer, the rich are richer, everybody’s healthy and free to live out their dreams.”

### Rule Making CP

#### Text: The United States federal government should delegate antitrust rulemaking authority to a new expert agency. The agency should begin notice-and-comment rulemaking to substantially increase prohibitions on anticompetitive business practices by the private sector by at least expanding the scope of its core antitrust laws by interpreting profit as an anticompetitive business practice.

#### Solves the case, engages notice and comment.

Rebecca Haw 11. Climenko Fellow and Lecturer on Law, Harvard Law School. J.D., Harvard Law School, 2008; M. Phil, Cambridge University, 2005; B.A., Yale University, 2001."Amicus Briefs and the Sherman Act: Why Antitrust Needs a New Deal." Texas Law Review, vol. 89, no. 6, May 2011, p. 1247-1292. HeinOnline.

Without the informational benefits of expertise and notice-and-comment rulemaking, the Court may be a poor choice to define the broad proscriptions of the Sherman Act. Framed this way, the problem has an obvious solution: give the power to interpret the Act to an expert agency.240 This idea has academic support already, 241 and the case for it is strengthened by this Article's observation that the Court has tried to approximate administrative decision making by relying on amicus briefs. The obvious candidates for reallocation are the two existing antitrust agencies: the Department of Justice's Antitrust Division and the FTC.

A. The Agency Solution

Using agencies to give specific meaning to American antitrust's most important statute means avoiding the problems with the Court's current quasi-administrative process for rulemaking. As adjudicators, agency experts would know what kind of economic evidence is necessary for an efficient solution and would be better able to understand it when it is presented by the parties. Repeat exposure to antitrust cases would only reinforce this advantage, while also giving the administrative judges a broader perspective on what kinds of conflicts commonly arise in competition law, a perspective necessary for efficient policy making in the first instance. A Supreme Court Justice hears about one antitrust case a year, hardly the cross section of controversies necessary to make efficient economic policy writ large.

Agencies could take policy making a step further using notice-and-comment rulemaking. Unlike in adjudication, regulation by rulemaking can be initiated without the formal requirements of a case or controversy and a proper appeal to the Supreme Court. Informal letters of complaint could spark an investigation. A rule-making agency could announce its intention to regulate publicly and provide a convenient venue for, or even solicit, expert opinions on the economic impact of the proposed rule. Not only would it have the benefit of these numerous perspectives, but it would also have the obligation to respond to them in a reasoned manner. Its rule would be subject to judicial review, affording an opportunity to catch mistakes 242 or invalidate rules that do nothing but deliver rents to special interests.

Another advantage of rulemaking, an option for agencies but not for the Court, since it only operates through adjudication, is that rulemaking regulates behavior ex ante, while resolution of economic policy through cases is necessarily ex post. Antitrust courts worry obsessively about "chill"--deterring procompetitive behavior with overly broad rules for liability.2 43 In fact, the overruling of Dr. Miles in Leegin implies that the entire twentieth century was a period of inefficient business practices and stunted innovation in distribution because of an early misunderstanding of RPM. Only after a long and expensive period of litigation was Leegin redeemed for breaking the law by effecting a change in the law, and only after Leegin was issued were similar firms, perhaps walking the Colgate line better than Leegin, redeemed for wanting some control over their product's ultimate retail price.24 4 The problem of ex post rulemaking is made worse by the treble damages afforded successful plaintiffs suing under the Sherman Act.2 4 5 To create a new form of liability, the Court has to punish a firm threefold for complying with standing antitrust norms. Thus Supreme Court lawmaking in antitrust is a kind of one-way ratchet.246

The result of the current ex post scheme is that "antitrust law leaves considerable gaps between what is permissible and what is optimal." 2 47 With judges making the rules one case at a time, this gap is justifiable. As discussed above, when judges are not economically sophisticated enough to know where "optimal" lies, 24 8 laissez-faire is a very inexpensive regulatory regime for courts to follow, and raising the level of regulation would effect a kind of taking of property from firms operating under the status quo. So if the Court is making antitrust policy, laissez-faire may be the only sensible approach. But that is not to say that it is the most sensible approach. An agency could provide firms with the necessary clarity-ex ante-that they need when conducting business in a world where competitive behavior so closely resembles anticompetitive conduct. The current state of affairs is that much more is illegal on the books than antitrust lawyers think is actually likely to be struck down in a court.24 9 Lawyers thrive in such a legally uncertain world, but firm efficiency suffers.

#### Key to democracy and court acquiescence---notice and comment engages participants and creates deference.

Harry First and Spencer Weber Waller 13. Harry First, New York University School of Law. Spencer Weber Waller, Loyola University Chicago School of Law. “Antitrust’s Democracy Deficit”. Fordham Law Review, Volume 81 Issue 5 Article 13. https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4890&context=flr

Redressing antitrust’s democracy deficit on the procedural side can be done with the tools of administrative law. Administrative law is the body of law that controls the procedures of governmental decision making.151 It allows interested persons to participate in decisions that affect their interests. Normally, it requires appropriate notice, the right to be heard, fair procedures, protection of fundamental rights, and judicial review of the resulting decision. These basic features are present in the administrative laws of most foreign legal systems and are part of a growing international consensus.152 The tradeoff is that the decisions of administrative agencies that properly follow these strictures normally are granted a degree of deference as to the interpretation of the laws they enforce.153 Frequently, but not inevitably, private parties also have the right to proceed with actions for damages against private parties who violate their regulatory obligations and even against the government itself when it acts unlawfully, either substantively or procedurally. These tools of administrative law are available to make antitrust enforcement decisions more transparent and more responsive to the interests that the antitrust laws were meant to serve, thereby promoting both better decision making and greater democratic legitimacy.

CONCLUSION

Free markets and free people cannot be assured by the efforts of technocrats. Ultimately, both come about through the workings of democratic institutions, respectful of the legislature’s goals and constrained from engaging in arbitrary action. Antitrust has moved too far from democratic institutions and toward technocratic control, in service to a laissez-faire approach to antitrust enforcement. We need to move the needle back. Doing so will strengthen the institutions of antitrust, the market economy, and the democratic branches of government themselves.

#### US democratic retreat causes terrorism, great power war, famine, and poverty.

Garry Kasparov 17. Chairman of the Human Rights Foundation, founded the Renew Democracy Initiative. “Democracy and Human Rights: The Case for U.S. Leadership”. Feb 16 2017. U.S. Senate. http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/021617\_Kasparov\_%20Testimony.pdf

The Soviet Union was an existential threat, and this focused the attention of the world, and the American people. There existential threat today is not found on a map, but it is very real. The forces of the past are making steady progress against the modern world order. Terrorist movements in the Middle East, extremist parties across Europe, a paranoid tyrant in North Korea threatening nuclear blackmail, and, at the center of the web, an aggressive KGB dictator in Russia. They all want to turn the world back to a dark past because their survival is threatened by the values of the free world, epitomized by the United States. And they are thriving as the U.S. has retreated. The global freedom index has declined for ten consecutive years. No one like to talk about the United States as a global policeman, but this is what happens when there is no cop on the beat. American leadership begins at home, right here. America cannot lead the world on democracy and human rights if there is no unity on the meaning and importance of these things. Leadership is required to make that case clearly and powerfully. Right now, Americans are engaged in politics at a level not seen in decades. It is an opportunity for them to rediscover that making America great begins with believing America can be great. The Cold War was won on American values that were shared by both parties and nearly every American. Institutions that were created by a Democrat, Truman, were triumphant forty years later thanks to the courage of a Republican, Reagan. This bipartisan consistency created the decades of strategic stability that is the great strength of democracies. Strong institutions that outlast politicians allow for long-range planning. In contrast, dictators can operate only tactically, not strategically, because they are not constrained by the balance of powers, but cannot afford to think beyond their own survival. This is why a dictator like Putin has an advantage in chaos, the ability to move quickly. This can only be met by strategy, by long-term goals that are based on shared values, not on polls and cable news. The fear of making things worse has paralyzed the United States from trying to make things better. There will always be setbacks, but the United States cannot quit. The spread of democracy is the only proven remedy for nearly every crisis that plagues the world today. War, famine, poverty, terrorism–all are generated and exacerbated by authoritarian regimes. A policy of America First inevitably puts American security last. American leadership is required because there is no one else, and because it is good for America. There is no weapon or wall that is more powerful for security than America being envied, imitated, and admired around the world. Admired not for being perfect, but for having the exceptional courage to always try to be better. Thank you

### Advantage

#### \*1. Util is the only egalitarian metric---anything else collapses cooperation on collective action crises and makes extinction inevitable

Khan 18 (Risalat, activist and entrepreneur from Bangladesh passionate about addressing climate change, biodiversity loss, and other existential challenges. He was featured by The Guardian as one of the “young climate campaigners to watch” (2015). As a campaigner with the global civic movement Avaaz (2014-17), Risalat was part of a small core team that spearheaded the largest climate marches in history with a turnout of over 800,000 across 2,000 cities. After fighting for the Paris Agreement, Risalat led a campaign joined by over a million people to stop the Rampal coal plant in Bangladesh to protect the Sundarbans World Heritage forest, and elicited criticism of the plant from Crédit Agricolé through targeted advocacy. Currently, Risalat is pursuing an MPA in Environmental Science and Policy at Columbia University as a SIPA Environmental Fellow, “5 reasons why we need to start talking about existential risks,” https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/01/5-reasons-start-talking-existential-risks-extinction-moriori/)

Infinite future possibilities I find the story of the Moriori profound. It teaches me two lessons. Firstly, that human culture is far from immutable. That we can struggle against our baser instincts. That we can master them and rise to unprecedented challenges. Secondly, that even this does not make us masters of our own destiny. We can make visionary choices, but the future can still surprise us. This is a humbling realization. Because faced with an uncertain future, the only wise thing we can do is prepare for possibilities. Standing at the launch pad of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, the possibilities seem endless. They range from an era of abundance to the end of humanity, and everything in between. How do we navigate such a wide and divergent spectrum? I am an optimist. From my bubble of privilege, life feels like a rollercoaster ride full of ever more impressive wonders, even as I try to fight the many social injustices that still blight us. However, the accelerating pace of change amid uncertainty elicits one fundamental observation. Among the infinite future possibilities, only one outcome is truly irreversible: extinction. Concerns about extinction are often dismissed as apocalyptic alarmism. Sometimes, they are. But repeating that mankind is still here after 70 years of existential warning about nuclear warfare is a straw man argument. The fact that a 1000-year flood has not happened does not negate its possibility. And there have been far too many nuclear near-misses to rest easy. As the World Economic Forum’s Annual Meeting in Davos discusses how to create a shared future in a fractured world, here are five reasons why the possibility of existential risks should raise the stakes of conversation: 1. Extinction is the rule, not the exception More than 99.9% of all the species that ever existed are gone. Deep time is unfathomable to the human brain. But if one cares to take a tour of the billions of years of life’s history, we find a litany of forgotten species. And we have only discovered a mere fraction of the extinct species that once roamed the planet. In the speck of time since the first humans evolved, more than 99.9% of all the distinct human cultures that have ever existed are extinct. Each hunter-gatherer tribe had its own mythologies, traditions and norms. They wiped each other out, or coalesced into larger formations following the agricultural revolution. However, as major civilizations emerged, even those that reached incredible heights, such as the Egyptians and the Romans, eventually collapsed. It is only in the very recent past that we became a truly global civilization. Our interconnectedness continues to grow rapidly. “Stand or fall, we are the last civilization”, as Ricken Patel, the founder of the global civic movement Avaaz, put it. 2. Environmental pressures can drive extinction More than 15,000 scientists just issued a ‘warning to humanity’. They called on us to reduce our impact on the biosphere, 25 years after their first such appeal. The warning notes that we are far outstripping the capacity of our planet in all but one measure of ozone depletion, including emissions, biodiversity, freshwater availability and more. The scientists, not a crowd known to overstate facts, conclude: “soon it will be too late to shift course away from our failing trajectory, and time is running out”. In his 2005 book Collapse, Jared Diamond charts the history of past societies. He makes the case that overpopulation and resource use beyond the carrying capacity have often been important, if not the only, drivers of collapse. Even though we are making important incremental progress in battles such as climate change, we must still achieve tremendous step changes in our response to several major environmental crises. We must do this even while the world’s population continues to grow. These pressures are bound to exert great stress on our global civilization. 3. Superintelligence: unplanned obsolescence? Imagine a monkey society that foresaw the ascendance of humans. Fearing a loss of status and power, it decided to kill the proverbial Adam and Eve. It crafted the most ingenious plan it could: starve the humans by taking away all their bananas. Foolproof plan, right? This story describes the fundamental difficulty with superintelligence. A superintelligent being may always do something entirely different from what we, with our mere mortal intelligence, can foresee. In his 2014 book Superintelligence, Swedish philosopher Nick Bostrom presents the challenge in thought-provoking detail, and advises caution. Bostrom cites a survey of industry experts that projected a 50% chance of the development of artificial superintelligence by 2050, and a 90% chance by 2075. The latter date is within the life expectancy of many alive today. Visionaries like Stephen Hawking and Elon Musk have warned of the existential risks from artificial superintelligence. Their opposite camp includes Larry Page and Mark Zuckerberg. But on an issue that concerns the future of humanity, is it really wise to ignore the guy who explained the nature of space to us and another guy who just put a reusable rocket in it? 4. Technology: known knowns and unknown unknowns Many fundamentally disruptive technologies are coming of age, from bioengineering to quantum computing, 3-D printing, robotics, nanotechnology and more. Lord Martin Rees describes potential existential challenges from some of these technologies, such as a bioengineered pandemic, in his book Our Final Century. Imagine if North Korea, feeling secure in its isolation, could release a virulent strain of Ebola, engineered to be airborne. Would it do it? Would ISIS? Projecting decades forward, we will likely develop capabilities that are unthinkable even now. The unknown unknowns of our technological path are profoundly humbling. 5. 'The Trump Factor' Despite our scientific ingenuity, we are still a confused and confusing species. Think back to two years ago, and how you thought the world worked then. Has that not been upended by the election of Donald Trump as US President, and everything that has happened since? The mix of billions of messy humans will forever be unpredictable. When the combustible forces described above are added to this melee, we find ourselves on a tightrope. What choices must we now make now to create a shared future, in which we are not at perpetual risk of destroying ourselves? Common enemy to common cause Throughout history, we have rallied against the ‘other’. Tribes have overpowered tribes, empires have conquered rivals. Even today, our fiercest displays of unity typically happen at wartime. We give our lives for our motherland and defend nationalistic pride like a wounded lion. But like the early Morioris, we 21st-century citizens find ourselves on an increasingly unstable island. We may have a violent past, but we have no more dangerous enemy than ourselves. Our task is to find our own Nunuku’s Law. Our own shared contract, based on equity, would help us navigate safely. It would ensure a future that unleashes the full potential of our still-budding human civilization, in all its diversity. We cannot do this unless we are humbly grounded in the possibility of our own destruction. Survival is life’s primal instinct. In the absence of a common enemy, we must find common cause in survival. Our future may depend on whether we realize this.

#### \*2. No modelling---divergences in implementation inevitable, especially with an arbitrary standard.

Ma. Joy V. Abrenica 18. Professor, School of Economics, University of the Philippines Diliman. BALANCING CONSUMER WELFARE AND PUBLIC INTEREST IN COMPETITION LAW. 13:2 Asian J WTO & Int'l Health L & Pol'y 443. 2018. Pg 448-449

The economic approach to antitrust enforcement has been embraced not only by the U.S. and European Commission (hereinafter "EC"), but also by developing countries whose antitrust laws were very much influenced by these two regimes. The OECD describes the convergence among antitrust regimes as follows: There is general consensus that the basic objective of competition law is to protect and preserve competition as the most appropriate means of ensuring the efficient allocation of resources . . . in free market economies. While countries differ somewhat in defining efficient market outcomes, there is general agreement that the concept is manifested by lower consumer prices, higher quality products and better product choice. 22 But the adoption of a common framework has not resulted in uniform implementation of competition principles. This is because most competition regimes are still conditioned by the zeitgeist of their own competition law, as well as by social and political realities in the domestic front. Two opposing philosophies are driving antitrust enforcement in different directions. One perspective presumes that unencumbered markets are vulnerable to abuse of dominance and collusion among competing producers; thus vigorous enforcement is necessary to preserve competition. Another perspective holds that market competition is robust and could prevail upon any private attempt to suppress it; therefore, rigid enforcement is counterproductive as it could undermine rivalry, hinder innovation and thus harm consumers in the long term. Most regimes would strive for the middle ground, i.e., neither intransigent nor too lenient. However, the effects of and intent behind market behavior are rarely apparent and often difficult to discern. This could result in a finding of infringement when in fact the conduct is a legitimate response to competitive pressure (type 1 error), or a failure to foil an anticompetitive conduct as it is mistaken for an innocuous pursuit of efficiency (type 2 error). Both types of error could ruin competition. Indeed, striking the right balance in enforcement is arduous and mature jurisdictions are not exempted from the challenge. One observes notable disagreements between the U.S. and EC on such issues as refusal to deal and reverse patent payments, for example, as well as flip-flopping of decisions on various forms of vertical restraints. The divergence in views and inconsistencies in decision is probably inevitable as the understanding of economic behavior and market processes continue to evolve. Boudreaux explained: Almost all of the original bases for antitrust intervention have been shattered by sound economics. Price-cutting is no longer an obvious means of monopolizing; bigness is no longer believed to be inevitable, inevitably harmful, or perpetual; and the myriad contracting arrangements devised by actual market participants are increasingly understood to enhance competition despite having been ignored by authors of textbooks. The advances that have occurred in economic theorizing are generally abstruse demonstrations of theoretical possibilities. Only when these theories have been supported by solid empirical findings should they serve as the basis for policy . . .. (emphases added)23 Against this perplexed environment in the backdrop, the meshing of public interest and competition objectives adds further complication, uncertainty and unpredictability in competition enforcement.

#### \*\*3. Expanded antitrust causes a wave of additional expansions---tanks current Big Tech innovation and economic output.

Wayne Brough 6-15. Policy Director at R-Street, Technology & Innovation. Washington wants to weaponize antitrust law to attack “Big Tech” and it is going to backfire horribly. R Street. 6-15-2021. https://www.rstreet.org/2021/06/15/washington-wants-to-weaponize-antitrust-law-to-attack-big-tech-and-it-is-going-to-backfire-horribly/

Solutions in Search of a Problem

As with many other regulatory incursions into the digital world, the renewed push for tougher antitrust laws is a solution in search of a problem. Both Republican and Democratic criticisms of Big Tech raise a litany of issues—from an anti-conservative bias to fake news and hate speech—none of which fall within the purview of antitrust law and anticompetitive behavior. Instead, the new regulatory regime under consideration is a punitive and political attack on politically disfavored corporations. Ultimately, that is the larger battle—abandoning the consumer welfare standard and its focus on demonstrable consumer harm in favor of a politicized regime that allows those in Congress greater control over private companies.

And while tech companies may be the exclusive focus of the current reforms, the scope of the proposed legislation could easily be expanded by a future Congress. Even today, many lawmakers are openly hostile toward a growing list of American businesses. Republicans have been vocal in calling for retaliatory measures against “woke” corporations deemed too progressive in their public stances. If policymakers continue to abandon economic principles, it would not be surprising to see calls for additional antitrust enforcement for any company that makes political waves.

Prior to the adoption of the consumer welfare standard almost 50 years ago, antitrust law was often confusing, economically suspect and even contradictory. In one notorious case, the Supreme Court blocked a merger where the merged company would have had a market share of merely 7.5 percent—hardly an example of market dominance. And economists examining antitrust enforcement prior to the consumer welfare standard found no correlation between antitrust enforcement and a reduction in the welfare losses from monopoly. Further research found congressional influence to be a better predictor of enforcement activity.

The consumer welfare standard helped rationalize antitrust enforcement and the case law that has emerged since its adoption has helped curb the political abuse of antitrust policies. Abandoning the need to identify demonstrable consumer harm would return antitrust law to an era characterized by arbitrary enforcement actions that many in today’s Congress seem to have forgotten. But the increased political oversight that comes with adopting more aggressive tools for antitrust enforcement poses a real threat to consumers, to innovation and to economic growth.

Abandoning the American Way in Favor of a European One

The bills introduced in the House can be interpreted as a turn toward a European approach to competition policy. Last year, the EU passed the Digital Markets Act, and the House proposals sound eerily similar. The EU started by defining “gatekeepers,” something similar to the “covered platforms” in the House bills. Restrictions on self-preferencing, interoperability requirements and other elements introduced in the House all have direct counterparts in the EU’s law.

The EU adopted its laws with a clear target in mind—American tech companies that were dominating markets in Europe and outperforming their European rivals. Politically, it made sense to rewrite the rules of the game in favor of homegrown talent. Among other things, this meant the EU could collect billion-dollar fines from American companies, all in the name of “fair competition.”

But the performance of European companies is probably the best reason not to follow the EU’s lead in redefining how we regulate competition. By virtually every measure, U.S. companies have been more innovative, more dynamic and more profitable than their European counterparts. There are more start-ups in the United States and they have greater access to capital. While the United States and the EU have economies of similar magnitudes, in 2019, U.S. startups had a valuation of $1.37 trillion compared to EU startups with an evaluation of $240 billion.

The rise of Silicon Valley is an American success story. Today the top five companies in the United States based on market capitalization are tech companies. They have led the digital revolution, providing consumers a virtually endless stream of new products at low or even zero cost in many cases. These are signs of a robust market that serves consumers well. It is important to remember that big does not equate to bad—sometimes a firm is large because it is efficient at serving its customers what they want. The tech sector supports 12 million jobs and more than $2 trillion in economic output. Current antitrust laws grounded in the consumer welfare standard are part of the institutional framework that make this possible. Congress should ensure antitrust laws fit best into the modern U.S. economy, but the House proposals are a radical departure that shifts the focus to protecting competitors rather than consumers. They would weaponize antitrust law, provide politicians a greater say in America’s boardrooms and replace economic efficiency with political expediency and preference.

#### \*\*Wrecks all sectors of the economy.

Daren Bakst and Gabriella Beaumont-Smith 20. Senior Research Fellow in Agricultural Policy in the Thomas A. Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies, of the Institute for Economic Freedom, The Heritage Foundation. Policy Analyst for Macroeconomics in the Center for Data Analysis, of the Institute for Economic Freedom. A Conservative Guide to the Antitrust and Big Tech Debate. Heritage Foundation. 12-1-2020. https://www.heritage.org/technology/report/conservative-guide-the-antitrust-and-big-tech-debate

The United States should reward success, not punish it. Yet, the “big is bad” mindset is all about punishment. It would move the country to a misguided federal government intervention of “too big to succeed.” This should be rejected. Some of the criticism of Big Tech is reasonable, but it fails to make the case for changing antitrust law. Conservative critics are right to be worried about censorship, but they should not let this worry lead them to use the wrong tool to address their concerns and thereby make bad policy choices.

Increasing the federal government’s control over the economy by using antitrust law to go after the technology sector would be a bad policy choice. Even worse, many of the changes would not merely affect the technology sector, but all sectors of the economy. Policymakers should recognize that antitrust law is perfectly capable of addressing genuine anticompetitive behavior. Conservatives should be the stalwarts of economic freedom and liberty, fighting back against these measures that could undermine Americans’ freedom and prosperity.

#### \*\*Economic decline causes great power war.

Qian Liu 18. China-based economist. “From economic crisis to World War III.” Project Syndicate. 11-8-2018. https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/economic-crisis-military-conflict-or-structural-reform-by-qian-liu-2018-11

The next economic crisis is closer than you think. But what you should really worry about is what comes after: in the current social, political, and technological landscape, a prolonged economic crisis, combined with rising income inequality, could well escalate into a major global military conflict. The 2008-09 global financial crisis almost bankrupted governments and caused systemic collapse. Policymakers managed to pull the global economy back from the brink, using massive monetary stimulus, including quantitative easing and near-zero (or even negative) interest rates. But monetary stimulus is like an adrenaline shot to jump-start an arrested heart; it can revive the patient, but it does nothing to cure the disease. Treating a sick economy requires structural reforms, which can cover everything from financial and labour markets to tax systems, fertility patterns, and education policies. Policymakers have utterly failed to pursue such reforms, despite promising to do so. Instead, they have remained preoccupied with politics. From Italy to Germany, forming and sustaining governments now seems to take more time than actual governing. Greece, for example, has relied on money from international creditors to keep its head (barely) above water, rather than genuinely reforming its pension system or improving its business environment. The lack of structural reform has meant that the unprecedented excess liquidity that central banks injected into their economies was not allocated to its most efficient uses. Instead, it raised global asset prices to levels even higher than those prevailing before 2008. In the United States, housing prices are now 8% higher than they were at the peak of the property bubble in 2006, according to the property website Zillow. The price-to-earnings (CAPE) ratio, which measures whether stock-market prices are within a reasonable range, is now higher than it was both in 2008 and at the start of the Great Depression in 1929. As monetary tightening reveals the vulnerabilities in the real economy, the collapse of asset-price bubbles will trigger another economic crisis – one that could be even more severe than the last, because we have built up a tolerance to our strongest macroeconomic medications. A decade of regular adrenaline shots, in the form of ultra-low interest rates and unconventional monetary policies, has severely depleted their power to stabilise and stimulate the economy. If history is any guide, the consequences of this mistake could extend far beyond the economy. According to Harvard’s Benjamin Friedman, prolonged periods of economic distress have been characterised also by public antipathy toward minority groups or foreign countries – attitudes that can help to fuel unrest, terrorism, or even war. For example, during the Great Depression, US President Herbert Hoover signed the 1930 Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act, intended to protect American workers and farmers from foreign competition. In the subsequent five years, global trade shrank by two-thirds. Within a decade, World War II had begun. To be sure, WWII, like World War I, was caused by a multitude of factors; there is no standard path to war. But there is reason to believe that high levels of inequality can play a significant role in stoking conflict. According to research by the economist Thomas Piketty, a spike in income inequality is often followed by a great crisis. Income inequality then declines for a while, before rising again, until a new peak – and a new disaster. Though causality has yet to be proven, given the limited number of data points, this correlation should not be taken lightly, especially with wealth and income inequality at historically high levels. This is all the more worrying in view of the numerous other factors stoking social unrest and diplomatic tension, including technological disruption, a record-breaking migration crisis, anxiety over globalisation, political polarisation, and rising nationalism. All are symptoms of failed policies that could turn out to be trigger points for a future crisis. Voters have good reason to be frustrated, but the emotionally appealing populists to whom they are increasingly giving their support are offering ill-advised solutions that will only make matters worse. For example, despite the world’s unprecedented interconnectedness, multilateralism is increasingly being eschewed, as countries – most notably, Donald J. Trump’s US – pursue unilateral, isolationist policies. Meanwhile, proxy wars are raging in Syria and Yemen. Against this background, we must take seriously the possibility that the next economic crisis could lead to a large-scale military confrontation. By the logic of the political scientist Samuel Huntington, considering such a scenario could help us avoid it because it would force us to take action. In this case, the key will be for policymakers to pursue the structural reforms that they have long promised while replacing finger-pointing and antagonism with a sensible and respectful global dialogue. The alternative may well be global conflagration.

#### \*6. Growth solves Inequality.

Tejvan Pettinger 19. Economic teacher and graduate with a degree from Oxford University. "Benefits of economic growth." Economics Help. 12-14-2019. https://www.economicshelp.org/macroeconomics/economic-growth/benefits-growth/

Economic growth means an increase in real GDP – an increase in the value of national output, income and expenditure. Essentially the benefit of economic growth is higher living standards – higher real incomes and the ability to devote more resources to areas like health care and education.

[Chart Omitted]

real-gdp-1955

UK real GDP since 1955. Shows the magnitude of increased national output.

The benefits of economic growth include

benefits-growth

Higher average incomes. Economic growth enables consumers to consume more goods and services and enjoy better standards of living. Economic growth during the Twentieth Century was a major factor in reducing absolute levels of poverty and enabling a rise in life expectancy.

Lower unemployment. With higher output and positive economic growth, firms tend to employ more workers creating more employment.

[Chart Omitted]

unemployment-total

UK unemployment rises during a recession – falls during periods of economic growth.

Lower government borrowing. Economic growth creates higher tax revenues, and there is less need to spend money on benefits such as unemployment benefit. Therefore economic growth helps to reduce government borrowing. Economic growth also plays a role in reducing debt to GDP ratios.

[Chart Omitted]

uk-national-debt

A long period of economic growth in the post-war period helped reduce the UK debt to GDP ratio.

Improved public services. Higher economic growth leads to higher tax revenues and this enables the government can spend more on public services, such as health care and education e.t.c. This can enable higher living standards, such as increased life expectancy, higher rates of literacy and a greater understanding of civic and political issues.

Money can be spent on protecting the environment. With higher economic growth a society can devote more resources to promoting recycling and the use of renewable resources

Investment. Economic growth encourages firms to invest, in order to meet future demand. Higher investment increases the scope for future economic growth – creating a virtuous cycle of economic growth/investment.

Increased research and development. High economic growth leads to increased profitability for firms, enabling more spending on research and development. Also, sustained economic growth increases confidence and encourages firms to take risks and innovate.

Economic development. The biggest factor for promoting economic development is sustained economic growth. Economic growth in south-east Asia over the past few decades has played a major role in reducing absolute levels of poverty – increasing life expectancy.

More choice. In less developed economies, a large proportion of the population work in agriculture/subsistence farming, economic growth enables a more diverse economy with people able to work in service sector, manufacturing and having a greater choice of lifestyles.

#### \*7. No space war, and no impact if it does happen

Roger Handberg 17, Professor in the School of Politics, Security, and International Affairs at the University of Central Florida, 2017, “Is space war imminent? Exploring the possibility,” Comparative Strategy, Vol. 36, No. 5, p. 413-425

The assumption made is that space war will be successfully waged in both the heavens and on the Earth itself. This assumption, however, is grounded on several hypotheticals occurring. First, that total devastating strategic surprise can be achieved—the side attacked becomes so damaged and devastated that further resistance is impossible to sustain regardless of national will, since nuclear weapons overhang the entire enterprise. The analogy usually invoked for American audiences is a “Pearl Harbor” type attack. This scenario is premised on equivalent American incompetence and lack of readiness as exhibited in December 1941. One must note that Pearl Harbor ended as a strategic failure for Japan—it led to defeat because the attack mobilized U.S. power without hesitation, given the intense political divisions over whether to enter the worldwide conflicts already raging. The attack was a military failure because Navy carriers were not destroyed along with battleship row along with critical fuel facilities. Similar analogies invoke September 11, 2001 as the prototype for such attacks more recently, but the same caveats apply. Total surprise assumes that all relevant opponent systems and civilian assets are disabled and left vulnerable to follow on attacks. In fact, collapse of U.S. defenses leaves U.S. cities as hostages to the rulers of the heavens, or vice versa if the U.S. moves first. Space war is extremely destabilizing, as will be discussed, since survivability of one's strategic assets becomes problematic.

Second, surprise requires that sufficient offensive space assets be placed in orbit without triggering a response by other states—the scale of such technology deployment is in itself possibly self-defeating given high costs and a likely lack of launch capacity. In addition, much launch capacity is now international rather than national, so maintaining secrecy becomes even more difficult. Space as an operational environment suffers from excessive transparency, meaning any launches can be monitored and tracked by others with strong evidence as to what is being deployed. One must remember that the original satellite launches in the 1950s were accurately tracked by a British grade-school class as a science project. In addition, at least since the early 1960s, remote sensing has increased exponentially the global capability to detect buildup of military assets of differing types, whether in space or on the ground. Commercial remote-sensing capabilities further enhance the capacity to detect militarily relevant actions. For example, commercial imagery is accessed by private parties to monitor the North Korean missile and nuclear weapons programs, in effect expanding the capacity of the world to look in on various states' interior regions, scanning for relevant information, including weapons buildup and launch capabilities. Even construction of physical facilities for production of space assets or for other weaponry can be monitored, making surprise more difficult but not impossible, as demonstrated in earlier monitoring of North Korea and, in 1998, the nuclear tests by both Pakistan and India. That means if the ASAT weapons come from ground locations, there is a high probability that they can be detected but no guarantee exists that detection will in fact occur. The uncertainty will impact calculations of attack success.

Third, the most obvious initial attack of space-based assets will most likely come from cyber attacks, given that such actions do not necessarily require the scale of resources necessary for other modalities such as kinetic weapons, or even lasers or other energy-type weapons. One will have to position the weapons plus the infrastructure to permit rapid recycling of the weapons for the next attack. Firing off interceptors will likely be a one-off, meaning extremely precise targeting will be required if the attack is to be successful. Note that none of these systems require that individuals be placed in Earth orbit, despite the imagery describing such operations in fictional universes.

Deployment requires a large lift capacity for initial deployment plus replenishment of destroyed or inoperative space assets, since a space conflict assumes that assets will be lost either kinetically or be compromised by cyber or energy beams. In any case, the combatants must be able to recover their capabilities lost during the conflict; failure to do would mean defeat or at least stalemate, negating the reason for the attack. That raises a major question when one considers the problem or expectation that space war can be successfully conducted or defended. Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) remains a critical weak point for all potential space-war participants. Loss of space assets occurs routinely during operations, but actual combat losses can be exponential depending on the weaponry used, and replacing those losses becomes the race to the next level after the initial exchange or combat. Unfortunately, ORS remains a major weakness of the United States and likely other states; deploying replacement satellites remains a multiyear process, while launch capabilities are scheduled long in advance. The rise of multiple private-launch competitors may partially alleviate some of the delay but that remains problematic given that the military payloads may be competing with commercial vendors also trying to replace losses. The tradeoff is that. in principle, private-launch vendors may be able to do so more cheaply, but their capacity may be saturated by demand from the civil and commercial sectors, leaving few “uncommitted” launch options for military purposes. Normally this is not an issue, but the available launch options may be third party rather than national-flag carriers, which raises severe security concerns.

Fourth, several other assumptions become essential to make the strategy work, including that such an attack does not render Earth orbit so debris-saturated that further military space operations become impossible to sustain. Also, damage to civilian space assets remains, such that their continuation is possible if undamaged replacements can be quickly reintroduced to restart economically critical operations. Globalization has been fostered through satellite technologies. Their disruption can be devastating for all parties, regardless of who is the winner or the loser. What may occur is the graveyard of the modern economic system. No potential space participants would be immune to the damage, regardless of whether or not they were participants in the actual conflict.

Fifth, there must be no difficulty in separating potential targets from the enemy, allied states, and nonbelligerent states. This creates a situation in which the spread of space technologies globally complicates actions, expanding the range of participants beyond the combatants, much like earlier wars at sea, where there were the combatants' ships, along with those of nonbelligerents, including neutrals whom the combatants struggled to draw into the conflict on their side, or at least to render their services unavailable to the other side. The earliest discussion of space conflict was premised on Cold War analogies, meaning two major combatants, either U.S.–Russia, or U.S–-China, or even a three-way war. Presently, analyses focus on a bilateral conflict with the U.S. opposed to China and Russia. Whether that would occur is obviously unknown, despite political rhetoric about a Eurasia coalition of likeminded states. What it does is multiply the number of potential targets and complicates reactions to neutrals' actions to protect their interests or assets. The distinction between combatants and neutrals or third parties will be possibly blurred beyond separation. The byproduct of a kinetic space conflict is massive amounts of space debris, destroying or damaging most space assets regardless of their state sponsor or nationality. Initial attacks may be focused and precise, but the result is still the same. The debris generated by armed conflict will endure beyond the immediate clash. The obvious alternative is a strictly electronic attack on space assets' operating systems, leaving the satellites in orbit, although without the ability to move them or control possible erratic changes in orbit due to collisions with other space debris.

Other forms space war will take

Reality is more complicated—kinetic action produces debris, the ultimate deterrent to actual space war. Therefore, space war could likely track several distinct phases. The first is cyber attacks, which disable or destroy the working systems of the spacecraft or the ground-support network—in effect, a series of stealth attacks. Civilian satellites are extremely soft targets—defense requires a capacity to detect and analyze any attack on the spacecraft, not available presently for most commercial spacecraft due to cost considerations. Otherwise, one could use nuclear weapons to create electromagnetic pulses (EMP) which can fry unprotected electronics both in space and on the ground, depending on where the weapons are detonated. Interestingly, space war scenarios have some territorial war aspects in that any attacks on space assets will devastate both military and civilian targets without distinction between the war participants and civilians. Similar to unrestricted submarine warfare, all targets in the relevant area will become casualties or otherwise impacted in their operations.

Second, attacks that are conducted against the ground down links and/or communications systems, leaving the spacecraft without guidance or instructions, and also no information is returned to the commanders even if the satellites survive the initial onslaught. These can involve kinetic attacks against specific locations or insertion of special operations forces to render the facility inoperative. For example, antennas can be disabled or destroyed, disrupting operations until new facilities are brought online. Other alternatives could include kinetic weapons launched from space, “rods from God.”20 Air strike packages could include electronic warfare elements capable of scrambling or disrupting operations of such facilities even prior to physical strikes against the targets. Spacecraft not destroyed or disabled in the initial two stages of the attack can be directly attacked by “dazzling” their receivers, with laser impulses destroying the receivers for which there are few replacements without replacing the spacecraft physically.

Third, rapid replacement of inoperative satellites, regardless of the reasons, does not occur, which translates into a race for the third, possibly end, phase of the war, replenishment. Inability to replace losses may mean that none of the combatants are able to dominate in the end, meaning conventional conflict may be the outcome, although issues of global reach may confine conflicts to relatively small areas. In previous conventional conflicts, large-scale forces were moved, albeit slowly, across the globe to the conflict, i.e., Desert Shield morphing into Desert Storm after a nearly six-month buildup.

#### 9. System changes are infeasible---can’t get governmental or international buy-in---reform is comparatively quicker.

Ezra Klein 8/31/21. American journalist, political analyst, New York Times columnist, and the host of The Ezra Klein Show podcast. "Transcript: Ezra Klein Answers Listener Questions". No Publication. 8-31-2021. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/31/podcasts/transcript-ezra-klein-ask-me-anything.html

EZRA KLEIN: Yeah. And maybe we should do an episode on this. I have very complicated feelings about degrowth. So one is that it is tricky to talk about, as you say, because I find its advocates will continue to say that you’re defining it wrong. So let me use a definition from Hickel, which is, and I’m quoting him here, “Degrowth is a planned reduction of energy and resource throughput designed to bring the economy back into balance with the living world in a way that reduces inequality and improves human well-being.”

And so I’d note two things here. One is “designed.” Degrowth is, as its advocates understand it, a act of global economic planning really without equal anywhere in human history. It is an act of extraordinary central planning. So that’s one thing that is going to become important in my answer.

I’d say there’s part of this vision I’m sympathetic to, and then part of it that I just don’t think holds together. I would distinguish a critique of want and a critique of growth. And the way I would do that is that, as you hear if you listen to the show, I’m pretty critical of a lot of the ways capitalism generates desire.

Desire is something we build through advertising, through social mimicry. This is a show that is supported by advertising. This is part of the desire- generation complex in its business model. And we are told and taught to want a lot of things, not only that we don’t need, but that don’t make us happier. And so not all growth as measured by G.D.P. is good growth.

But a lot of what people want is fine, or great, or whatever. It’s their desire, and it’s not for me to tell them the jeans they’re interested in are incorrect. And a lot of it I don’t think is under the power of policymakers to control. I don’t think it’s all advertising. I don’t know that if you cut down advertising, the amount people would spend on consumption would go way down. They might simply consume other things.

And so I want people to have rich, materially fulfilling lives. And I think it’ll be a very hard piece to change. So in terms of having a counterweight to the materialism, the ideology of materialism in modern society, that’s a part of degrowth that I’m very open to.

But now let me talk about degrowth more in the terms of it is a direct political project, which is as an answer to climate change. I would cut this into a few pieces. Is degrowth necessary for addressing climate change? Is it the fastest way to address climate change? And is it desirable? It has to be at least one of those things to be the strategy you’d want to take.

And I don’t think it is. Let’s start with necessary. Many countries in Europe, even the United States, are growing while reducing their carbon footprint. Now, you could say they’re not doing so fast enough depending on the country. But they could all do so much faster if there was enough political will to deploy more renewable technology, to tax carbon, to do a bunch of things that we have not been able to pass. So it is clearly true that we can decouple growth and energy usage.

Hickel, to be fair, will say that that may be true. But given the speed at which we need to act, we can’t just be deploying renewable energy technology. It would also help the situation if we stopped using as much through material consumption. That is, I think, conceptually true and politically false.

I mean, let’s just state that speed is, first and foremost, a political problem

. There is a delta between where we are right now in terms of what we are doing on climate change and where we could be. That delta is big, and that delta gets bigger every year because it gets harder every year. And the time we have to act before we start getting some of the really truly catastrophic feedback loops in play is shortening. So you’re now talking here about the speed at which you can move politics.

So for something to be faster, it doesn’t just need to be faster if you implemented it. It needs to be something you can implement such it accelerates the politics of radical climate action. And that’s where I think degrowth completely falls apart. And I have tried to look for the answer people give on this, and I’ve never found one that is convincing.

So again, I’ll quote Hickel on this: “Degrowth has a discriminating approach to reducing economic activity. It seeks to scale down ecologically destructive and socially less necessary production, i.e., the production of S.U.V.s, arms, beef, private transportation, advertising and planned obsolescence” — by which he means there, the fact that expiration dates are built into a lot of our electronics — “while expanding socially important sectors like health care, education, care and conviviality.”

And I’d urge people to think about that for a minute. I mean, you can listen to that and you will assume correctly that I am sympathetic to the idea that a lot of those goods are not great. I’m a vegan. I don’t eat beef. I would like nobody else to eat beef.

I think that if the political demand of the climate movement becomes you don’t get to eat beef, you will set climate politics back so far, so fast, it would be disastrous. Same thing with S.U.V.s. I don’t like S.U.V.s. I don’t drive one. But if you are telling people in rich countries that the climate movement is for them not having the cars they want to have, you are just going to lose. You are going to lose fast.

We watched this happen for years before Elon Musk and some others began inventing cars that were both electrified and were actually cool cars. You weren’t going to get everybody in a Prius. You might, over time, get them into the post-Tesla generations of electronic vehicles.

This is where the politics of it for me fall apart. I’d at least like to see some empirical evidence for the claim that degrowthers are right, and that their appeal will speed the politics of doing hard things on climate change. Because I think it will do the opposite. And I don’t see politicians winning in the countries they would need to win on anything like this platform. Quite the contrary.

I watched the most effective attack against Joe Biden’s climate policies. It dominated the news for a day or two. It was Fox News just making up — just completely making up — a false claim that Biden was going to limit or restrict red meat.

ANNIE GALVIN: Right. [LAUGHS]

EZRA KLEIN: So my worry with degrowth is that it is trying to take the politics out of politics. It is attacking the flaws of the current strategy as not moving fast enough when the impediments are political, but then not accepting the impediments to its own political path forward.

I will say, because I think it’ll be weird to people if I don’t mention this, that there is the big problem, of course, that the rising generation of emissions is coming from China, from India. I think it’s something like ⅔ of emissions are now from middle income countries. That is only going up.

Hickel and other degrowthers will say that, yes, the point of this is that the rich countries, which have already used more than their fair share of the carbon budget, should cut their carbon usage so poor countries can grow. I cannot imagine how you are going to enforce this as a political and economic planning regime. How you will get rich countries to agree to do less so poor countries can have more. I mean, look at what has happened with vaccine hoarding.

I don’t want to say that this isn’t a good moral weight on the conversation or, in the long term, a good push for people to think about different ways of having growth, different ways of human flourishing. But the entirety — as the degrowth people will agree — the entire question of the climate change conversation is speed. And I just don’t see the argument for degrowth as being anything but an extraordinarily slower way of approaching the politics, probably counterproductive compared to what we’re doing, which is I think you can make tremendous strides on climate change by deploying renewable energy technologies and giving people the opportunity to have a more materially fulfilling life atop those technologies.

And by the way, when that happens in rich countries, as we have seen, it ends up subsidizing these renewable energy technological advances for poorer countries. So it is a fact that Germany and other countries did so much to subsidize solar for themselves, it has also made it possible for countries like China and India to have such a rapid advance in solar technology that it’s affordable for them to do a lot of their growth on that platform.

So I also think there are cross-subsidies in rich countries trying to maintain growth renewable energy deployment that end up helping poor countries change what they’re doing in a useful way, too. So that’s my take on degrowth. But I understand its appeal. I just don’t understand its politics.

## REGs

### General---2NC

#### Regs solve better --- empirically more effective than antitrust at achieving economic outcomes

Sumit K. Majumdar 21. Sumit K. Majumdar Ph. D. is Professor in the Jindal School of Management at the University of Texas at Dallas. “Stick Versus Carrot: Comparing Structural Antitrust and Behavioral Regulation Outcomes.” The Antitrust Bulletin. June 2021. DOI:[10.1177/0003603X211023463](https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603X211023463)

A. Evaluation of Structural Versus Behavioral Remedy Outcomes

The issue is which method works better, the antitrust (structural) or the regulatory (behavioral)? Using a standard test of differences in magnitude between two variables, as natural experiment 3 I evaluate if the antitrust (structural) approach or the regulatory (behavioral) remedy has had a greater impact in enhancing efficiency. Results are in Table 4. Column (A) relates to the performance outcome variable comparatively evaluated. Column (B) reports if the antitrust (structural) impact is less than that of the regulatory (behavioral) measures, on performance, and column (C) reports if the difference has been statistically significant.

**For the productive efficiency score, the regulatory (behavioral) remedy has statistically had a greater impact than the antitrust (structural) method in enhancing efficiency.** (Recollect that Tables 2 and 3 reported results on how the structural vs. behavioral remedies impacted efficiency scores. The impacts were 2.23% for the structural remedy (column [A] in panel [B] of Table 2) and 4.33% (column [A] in panel [B] of Table 3) for the behavioral remedy.)

B. Robustness Check

An evaluation of why price caps, as endogenous phenomena,64 were implemented would depend on firm-level factors, such as past performance; these would have influenced the implementation of price cap regulatory schemes for specific firms. As a robustness check, controlling for inclusion of endogenous factors, past performance variables have been included as price caps determinants for each observation, in a selection equation with the price cap variable then determining performance in an outcome equation. The results show the price cap estimates to be of relatively the same magnitude (in fact, they are larger), sign, and significance as the estimate values already reported in this article.65

C. Summary

**Overall, significantly larger positive outcomes have emerged from sector-specific regulatory (behavioral) remedy applications** vis-`a-vis the concurrent antitrust (structural) remedy application. The use of further performance variables to comparatively test the ideas has yielded very similar results. Such additional results are available on request.

#### 2. “Do both” is antitrust duplication---the disputes collapse resources, effectiveness, and signaling.

Carl W. Hittinger and Tyson Y. Herrold 19. Carl W. Hittinger (LAW ’79) is a senior partner and serves as BakerHostetler’s Antitrust and Competition Practice National Team Leader and the litigation group coordinator for the firm’s Philadelphia office. He concentrates his practice on complex commercial and civil rights trial and appellate litigation, with a particular emphasis on antitrust and unfair competition matters, including class actions. Tyson Y. Herrold is an associate in the firm’s Philadelphia office in its litigation group. His practice focuses on complex commercial litigation, particularly antitrust and unfair competition matters, as well as civil rights litigation. "Antitrust Agency Turf War Over Big Tech Investigations". Temple 10-Q. https://www2.law.temple.edu/10q/antitrust-agency-turf-war-over-big-tech-investigations/

Disputes over clearance can have tangible adverse effects on enforcement. First, some have commented that delays caused by clearance disputes can narrow the efficacy of remedial options, particularly with mergers. As Sen. Richard Blumenthal has commented, “The Big Tech companies are not waiting for the agencies to finish their cases. They are structuring their companies so that you can’t unscramble the egg.” Structural remedies are favored by Delrahim, who has commented that alternative, behavioral remedies should be used sparingly: “The division has a strong preference for structural remedies over behavioral ones. … The Antitrust Division is a law enforcer and, even where regulation is appropriate, it is not equipped to be the ongoing regulator.”

Second, disputes over clearance and, more so, duplicative investigations waste agency resources, threaten to blunt their effectiveness, and can lead to inconsistent and confusing governmental positions. In the Sept. 17 oversight hearing, Simons and Delrahim were both criticized for requesting an increase in funding: “As you both acknowledged, both of you could use, and desperately need, more resources. That being the case, it makes no sense to me that we should have duplication of effort, when that has a tendency inevitably to undermine the effectiveness of what you’re doing.” Duplicative investigations dilute the specialization that is a principal goal of the agencies’ clearance agreement and raise the risk that one agency will take legal positions that undercut the other. No doubt the DOJ’s amicus brief in the Qualcomm case influenced the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s decision to issue a stay pending appeal.

So how will the FTC and DOJ resolve their latest turf war? Perhaps they will revisit their clearance agreement and decide to split their authority by company or the business practice being investigated, based on prior agency experience, rather than by industry as Appendix A currently does. Or maybe Congress will decide to consolidate civil antitrust enforcement jurisdiction under one agency. That seems like a long shot considering the political implications. However, during the Senate’s antitrust oversight hearing, Sen. Josh Hawley proposed “cleaning up the overlap in jurisdiction by removing it from one agency” and “clearly designating enforcement authority to one agency.” One thing is sure—the agencies should not be duplicating civil antitrust investigations. Stay tuned.

#### “Expanding the scope” of “anti-trust laws” must be the DOJ and FTC.

Jarod Bona 21. Bona Law PC. "Five U.S. Antitrust Law Tips for Foreign Companies". Antitrust Attorney Blog. 1-16-2021. https://www.theantitrustattorney.com/five-u-s-antitrust-tips-foreign-companies/

1. Two federal and many state agencies enforce antitrust laws in the United States

The United States government has two separate antitrust agencies—the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ). The FTC is an independent federal agency controlled by several Commissioners, while the Antitrust Division of the DOJ is part of the Executive Branch, under the President.

Both of them enforce federal antitrust laws (among other laws). Their jurisdictions technically overlaps, but they tend to have informal agreements between each other for one or the other to handle certain industries or subjects. If you are part of a major industry, your antitrust lawyer may be able to tell you whether the DOJ or FTC is likely to oversee competition issues in your field.

#### Jurisdiction: the plan expands the DOJ and FTC role.

Babette E. Boliek 11. Associate Professor of Law at Pepperdine University School of Law. J.D., Columbia University School of Law; Ph.D., Economics University of California, Davis. FCC Regulation Versus Antitrust: How Net Neutrality is Defining the Boundaries, 52 B.C.L. Rev. 1627 (2011). <http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol52/iss5/2>

There is a crucial battle playing out in the world of Internet access provision. While the Internet is the natural home of competing business giants and warring digital avatars, the contest that will have the most sweeping ramifications for the future of the Internet is the turf war being waged between the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), on the one hand, and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Department of Justice (DOJ), on the other.1 Nothing less than jurisdiction over the development of the Internet is at stake.

Jurisdiction over Internet access provision is not the first confrontation between these particular government agencies; in fact, they have clashed many times.2 But it is the current iteration of the FCC’s “net neutrality” regulations that has generated the latest contest. Roughly defined, net neutrality encompasses principles of commercial Internet access that include equal treatment and delivery of all Internet applications and content.3 For some, net neutrality stands further for the proposition that Internet access operators should not be permitted to provide different qualities of service for certain application providers (e.g., guaranteed speeds of transmission), even if those application providers can freely choose their desired quality of service.4 Net neutrality has reinvigorated what may be described as an underlying interagency tug of war that reaches deep within, and far beyond, the communications industry.

Although the two regimes share a commonality of purpose—to protect consumers and to promote allocative efficiencies in production—the two have quite distinct, predominately opposing, means of securing social benefits. As Justice Stephen Breyer stated when serving as a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, although regulation and the antitrust laws “typically aim at similar goals—i.e., low and economically efficient prices, innovation, and efficient production methods” —regulation looks to achieve these goals directly “through rules and regulations; [but] antitrust seeks to achieve them indirectly by promoting and preserving a process that tends to bring them about.”5 The battle between these two regimes may be broadly summarized in a single issue thusly: in the face of the industry-specific regulator, what is (or what should be) the role of antitrust law?6

Antitrust law preserves the process of competition across all industries by condemning anticompetitive conduct when it occurs. In contrast, industrial regulation by its nature is a public declaration that, in a given industry, market forces are too weak or underdeveloped to produce the consumer benefits that are realized in competitive markets— regulated industries are carved out from the rest of the economy and are subject to proactive, regulatory intervention that goes above and beyond antitrust enforcement measures.7 Not surprisingly, regulatory agencies were historically created as substitutes for market forces in the few markets that, by the nature of the product or technology, were natural monopolies or severely prone to monopoly.8 In the vast major- ity of markets, however, the antitrust law is the default government control, designed to supplement market forces to inhibit or prevent the growth of monopoly.

Again, although the goals of the two regimes may be similar, the means by which each can achieve those goals are in opposition. Therefore, the threshold determination of which industries are to be singled out for industry-specific regulation, and to what degree, is of vital importance as it simultaneously determines the predominance of the regulator versus the antitrust authority in securing the social good.

This Article sets forth a framework to identify the boundaries between FCC regulatory power and antitrust authority. The goal is to pinpoint for Congress the problematic use of regulatory discretion in defining, or redefining, those boundaries and to propose the standard by which Congress may address inappropriate use of existing FCC jurisdiction. Specifically, this Article creates a new categorization of “procedural opportunism” and “substantive opportunism” to identify problematic, regulatory assertions of jurisdiction. The central issue examined in this Article is to posit what is (or should be) the boundaries of antitrust law in relation to the FCC’s regulatory authority. This important issue has reached a point of public crises in the current net neutrality debate.9 Rather than act reflexively, this is an opportunity for Congress to act clearly to redefine the boundaries between the two regimes that have otherwise been blurred by regulatory overreach.

#### 3. Legal code---antitrust requires Title 15 of US Code.

Sanjukta M. Paul 16. David J. Epstein Fellow, UCLA School of Law. The Enduring Ambiguities of Antitrust Liability for Worker Collective Action. Loyola University Chicago Law Journal. https://www.congress.gov/116/meeting/house/110152/witnesses/HHRG-116-JU05-Wstate-PaulS-20191029-SD002.pdf

Unlike the Clayton Act, which was the first legislative attempt at a labor exemption from antitrust,202 the Norris-La Guardia Act did not grapple directly with trade regulation in subject matter—even with how trade regulation applies to labor—although it had the effect of modifying its reach. Norris-La Guardia is not an antitrust statute. Instead, it is incorporated into Title 29 (“Labor”) of the United States Code. By contrast, the Clayton Act was conceived and written as an antitrust statute, was incorporated into Title 15, the antitrust and trade regulation section of the Code, and portions of it dealt with matters other than labor.

## FTC

#### **1. Algorithmic bias risks nuke war.**

Elsa B. Kania 17. Adjunct fellow with the Technology and National Security Program at the Center for a New American Security, 11/15/17. “The critical human element in the machine age of warfare.” https://thebulletin.org/2017/11/the-critical-human-element-in-the-machine-age-of-warfare/

Today, however, the human in question might be considerably less willing to question the machine. The known human tendency towards greater reliance on computer-generated or automated recommendations from intelligent decision-support systems can result in compromised decision-making. This dynamic—known as automation bias or the overreliance on automation that results in complacency—may become more pervasive, as humans accustom themselves to relying more and more upon algorithmic judgment in day-to-day life.

In some cases, the introduction of algorithms could reveal and mitigate human cognitive biases. However, the risks of algorithmic bias have become increasingly apparent. In a societal context, “biased” algorithms have resulted in discrimination; in military applications, the effects could be lethal. In this regard, the use of autonomous weapons necessarily conveys operational risk. Even greater degrees of automation—such as with the introduction of machine learning in systems not directly involved in decisions of lethal force (e.g., early warning and intelligence)—could contribute to a range of risks.

Friendly fire—and worse. As multiple militaries have begun to use AI to enhance their capabilities on the battlefield, several deadly mistakes have shown the risks of automation and semi-autonomous systems, even when human operators are notionally in the loop. In 1988, the USS Vincennes shot down an Iranian passenger jet in the Persian Gulf after the ship’s Aegis radar-and-fire-control system incorrectly identified the civilian airplane as a military fighter jet. In this case, the crew responsible for decision-making failed to recognize this inaccuracy in the system—in part because of the complexities of the user interface—and trusted the Aegis targeting system too much to challenge its determination. Similarly, in 2003, the US Army’s Patriot air defense system, which is highly automated with high levels of complexity, was involved in two incidents of fratricide. In these stances, “naïve” trust in the system and the lack of adequate preparation for its operators resulted in fatal, unintended engagements.

As the US, Chinese, and other militaries seek to leverage AI to support applications that include early warning, automatic target recognition, intelligence analysis, and command decision-making, it is critical that they learn from such prior errors, close calls, and tragedies. In Petrov’s successful intervention, his intuition and willingness to question the system averted a nuclear war. In the case of the USS Vincennes and the Patriot system, human operators placed too much trust in and relied too heavily on complex, automated systems. It is clear that the mitigation of errors associated with highly automated and autonomous systems requires a greater focus on this human dimension.

#### 2. Algorithmic bias in AI is an existential threat.

Mara Hvistendahl 19 – correspondent with Science magazine, 3/28/19. “Can we stop AI outsmarting humanity?” <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/mar/28/can-we-stop-robots-outsmarting-humanity-artificial-intelligence-singularity>

Existential risks – or X-risks, as Tallinn calls them – are threats to humanity’s survival. In addition to AI, the 20-odd researchers at CSER study climate change, nuclear war and bioweapons. But, to Tallinn, those other disciplines “are really just gateway drugs”. Concern about more widely accepted threats, such as climate change, might draw people in. The horror of superintelligent machines taking over the world, he hopes, will convince them to stay. He was visiting Cambridge for a conference because he wants the academic community to take AI safety more seriously.

At Jesus College, our dining companions were a random assortment of conference-goers, including a woman from Hong Kong who was studying robotics and a British man who graduated from Cambridge in the 1960s. The older man asked everybody at the table where they attended university. (Tallinn’s answer, Estonia’s University of Tartu, did not impress him.) He then tried to steer the conversation toward the news. Tallinn looked at him blankly. “I am not interested in near-term risks,” he said.

Tallinn changed the topic to the threat of superintelligence. When not talking to other programmers, he defaults to metaphors, and he ran through his suite of them: advanced AI can dispose of us as swiftly as humans chop down trees. Superintelligence is to us what we are to gorillas.

An AI would need a body to take over, the older man said. Without some kind of physical casing, how could it possibly gain physical control?

Tallinn had another metaphor ready: “Put me in a basement with an internet connection, and I could do a lot of damage,” he said. Then he took a bite of risotto.

Every AI, whether it’s a Roomba or one of its potential world-dominating descendants, is driven by outcomes. Programmers assign these goals, along with a series of rules on how to pursue them. Advanced AI wouldn’t necessarily need to be given the goal of world domination in order to achieve it – it could just be accidental. And the history of computer programming is rife with small errors that sparked catastrophes. In 2010, for example, when a trader with the mutual-fund company Waddell & Reed sold thousands of futures contracts, the firm’s software left out a key variable from the algorithm that helped execute the trade. The result was the trillion-dollar US “flash crash”.

The researchers Tallinn funds believe that if the reward structure of a superhuman AI is not properly programmed, even benign objectives could have insidious ends. One well-known example, laid out by the Oxford University philosopher Nick Bostrom in his book Superintelligence, is a fictional agent directed to make as many paperclips as possible. The AI might decide that the atoms in human bodies would be better put to use as raw material.

Tallinn’s views have their share of detractors, even among the community of people concerned with AI safety. Some object that it is too early to worry about restricting superintelligent AI when we don’t yet understand it. Others say that focusing on rogue technological actors diverts attention from the most urgent problems facing the field, like the fact that the majority of algorithms are designed by white men, or based on data biased toward them. “We’re in danger of building a world that we don’t want to live in if we don’t address those challenges in the near term,” said Terah Lyons, executive director of the Partnership on AI, a technology industry consortium focused on AI safety and other issues. (Several of the institutes Tallinn backs are members.) But, she added, some of the near-term challenges facing researchers, such as weeding out algorithmic bias, are precursors to ones that humanity might see with super-intelligent AI.

Tallinn isn’t so convinced. He counters that superintelligent AI brings unique threats. Ultimately, he hopes that the AI community might follow the lead of the anti-nuclear movement in the 1940s. In the wake of the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, scientists banded together to try to limit further nuclear testing. “The Manhattan Project scientists could have said: ‘Look, we are doing innovation here, and innovation is always good, so let’s just plunge ahead,’” he told me. “But they were more responsible than that.”

#### 3. Algorithmic white supremacy turns case --- mass inequality

Bishop Garrison 19. Deputy Foreign Policy Adviser for Clinton, JD-William & Mary, Member of the Truman National Security Project’s Defense Council, Member of the Truman National Security Project’s Defense Council, served two deployments in Iraq in the Army, 2010 graduate of William and Mary Law School, served in various national security positions in the Obama Administration and served as Deputy Foreign Policy Adviser for the 2016 Clinton campaign, RACISM IS AN EXISTENTIAL THREAT, 2019, https://inkstickmedia.com/racism-is-an-existential-threat/

This hatred of communities of color and other vulnerable groups didn’t appear overnight. Its heritage is deeply rooted in slavery, the treatment of African slaves, and the continued struggle of the black American community for equal treatment. Now, arguably more than at any time in recent history, we need to recognize that extremism, racist policies, and white supremacy stand as existential threats not only to American life but to the future of our country and others around the globe. It’s time we have very real, very honest, and potentially very awkward conversations about race, the role it has played throughout American history, and what we are going to do to reconcile our past and protect our future.

Today, as immigrants of color continue to serve as scapegoats for the ills of American society, the Department of Housing and Urban Development has proposed a new rule that would allow landlords to use algorithms during the housing application review process — as a proxy for immutable traits otherwise protected by law: race, gender, and disability. These policies, which would apply to situations in which evidence of direct, intentional discrimination does not exist, would ultimately undermine, and perhaps near-completely impede, the ability of tenants to bring disparate impact discrimination claims against landlords, as long as the landlord stipulates that their intended use for the algorithm is not discriminatory and the third neutral party that develops the algorithm can attest to that fact. At the same time, the algorithms used would likely result in a disproportionately negative impact on protected tenants – partly because they provide cover to racist people who want to exclude black renters and draw a Venn diagram with a near-perfect circle around those who listen to rap music and those who tend to be black. We’re still doing this. Much like the use of biometric data and the algorithms of artificial intelligence that have difficulty differentiating faces of people of color, we’re still finding ways — new ways, in the technological age — to discriminate.

The country’s horrific history on race and its continued refusal to engage these problems head-on has exacerbated the issue to the point of a violent crisis. This crisis continues to seep into our state and local domestic policies, our technologies, the algorithms of social media companies, and (potentially) our future like a corrosive poison contaminating a water table. We will continue to face the nation-ending threat of white supremacy and white nationalist extremism unless we invest in Combating Violent Extremism (CVE) programs, which this administration has cut, and find the courage to have honest-to-God difficult, uncomfortable conversations in our homes and communities about our history of race and privilege in America and how it has shaped our lives today.

An example of this in practice is the New York Times Magazine’s 1619 Project, a series of opinion pieces, poetry, essays, and historical works designed to inform readers on the treatment and history of slavery, segregation, and Jim Crow laws in America. The project’s title comes from the August anniversary of the arrival of the first African slaves, 20-30 individuals from what is now modern-day Angola, in the British American colonies. Each work highlights not only past atrocities and injustices experienced by black Americans, but ongoing systemic issues that have plagued the nation from its original sin of slavery into the present day. It’s an important effort that may very well shape the dialogue around race, inclusion, and the need for steadfast policies that may one day fill the discriminatory gaps in our society and help heal the country. And the effort is, somehow, in 2019, controversial.

#### Algorithmic bias threatens democracy and equality.

Karl Manheim\* and Lyric Kaplan\*\*, 19 – \*Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, and \*\*Associate in Privacy & Data Security Group, Frankfurt Kurnit Klein & Selz. “Artificial Intelligence: Risks to Privacy and Democracy.” 21 Yale J.L. & Tech. 106. https://yjolt.org/sites/default/files/21\_yale\_j.l.\_tech.\_106\_0.pdf

Objectivity is not one of AI’s virtues. Rather, algorithms reflect back the biases in the programming that are input when models are de- signed and in the data used to train them. Additionally, while data analysis can identify relationships between behaviors and other var- iables, relationships are not always indicative of causality. There- fore, some data analysis can develop imperfect information caused by algorithmic limitations or biased sampling. As a result, decisions made by AI may intensify rather than remove human biases contrary to popular conception. 267 This poses real risks for equality and de- mocracy.

The main problem with “algorithmic bias” is the data that is used to “train” the AI how to solve problems. In the law context, typically, factors from the real world, such as those reported in a judicial opin- ion, are fed into the computer, along with doctrinal rules describing how the law is applied to the facts. The AI is likely to return a wrong answer (measured against the result in the training case) on the first try, and maybe on the hundredth try. But because of machine learn- ing, the AI adapts its algorithms until it eventually finds ones that return the same result as that of the training cases all or most of the time. However, training data can itself be biased, a feature that is simply amplified once the AI is let loose on a new set of facts. So, for instance, if historical data in criminal sentencing or crime statis- tics is racially biased, then the AI will be too each time it is used to recommend a sentence. The risks of training AI with inaccurate or biased data are also clear from the example of Microsoft’s Tay, a “teen-talking AI chatbot built to mimic and converse with users in real time.”268 Due to Tay’s machine learning capabilities, she was making racist and discriminatory tweets within a few hours.269 She was not designed to be human proof and block malicious intent. As Tay shows, AI functions can mirror and amplify societal biases and infirmities, only with the veneer of impartiality.270

#### 2. The FTC’s changing their approach to allow them to focus on enforcement cases

Lauren Feiner 21. News Associate at CNBC, 8/3/21. “FTC struggles to keep up with merger filings, tells some businesses to merge at own risk.” https://www.cnbc.com/2021/08/03/ftc-tells-some-businesses-to-merge-at-own-risk.html

By law, regulators have a set amount of time to review pre-merger filings before parties consummate their deals. Regulators can issue a so-called second request to halt the process and ask for more information, but after receiving those documents, they have a set period of time to review and choose whether to block the deal before parties can again move forward.

While declining to block a merger doesn’t count as a rubber stamp or preclude the regulator from seeking to unwind it in the future, it often provides businesses some reassurance to move forward in the process.

But due to constrained resources, Vedova said there are some deals the FTC simply cannot investigate fully within the timeframe set by law. As a result, the FTC has begun sending letters to parties in such deals that basically say the agency hasn’t completed its review but can’t hold up their merger any longer, so the parties should proceed at their own risk.

“Accordingly, even if the parties consummate the above-referenced transaction, the Commission may still take further action as the public interest may require, which may include any and all available legal actions and seeking any and all appropriate remedies,” a sample letter to such businesses says.

The FTC’s new approach will likely create more uncertainty for businesses whose deals remain under review outside of the standard timeline.

The FTC splits oversight of HSR merger review with the Department of Justice Antitrust Division. Still, both agencies have pleaded with lawmakers for years for more resources to deal with greater demands on their agencies. Both, for example, have filed within the last year major antitrust lawsuits against two of the largest businesses in the world: Facebook and Google.

Merger reviews can often take precedence over misconduct cases within the agencies due to the tight timeline regulators are bound to by law for M&A. The FTC’s new approach could give staff more room to work on non-merger cases even as the agency is faced with a surge in HSR filings.

#### 4. Other enforcement is all talk

JED GRAHAM 9/16/21. Writes about economic policy for Investor's Business Daily.

Khan is clearly using her bully pulpit to the utmost, trying to dissuade merger talks from reaching fruition.

But right now it's all talk. She has turned a few heads, but the S&P 500 and Big Tech leaders have kept cruising. Facebook stock is up 11% since Khan took the FTC's helm on June 15, while Apple has climbed 15% and Google stock 18%. That's despite reports that the Justice Department is preparing to file a second Google antitrust suit over its ad dominance.

The new antitrust enforcement regime may not change all that much "until they show that they can sue and win," Kovacic said.

#### 6. They’re getting a resource surge---but it’s narrow

Cat Zakrzewski 21. Technology policy reporter, tracking Washington's efforts to regulate Silicon Valley companies, 6/17/21. “Will Lina Khan bring a reckoning to Silicon Valley? She’ll face major challenges.” https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/06/17/lina-khan-ftc-actions/

It seems likely the agency will see its funding grow under Khan, especially after the Senate passed legislation that would overhaul merger filing fees to provide more financing to antitrust enforcers. House lawmakers have introduced a similar proposal, which is less controversial than some of the other tech competition bills.

## CASE

#### 2] Death is the ultimate evil because it is irreversible and ontologically destroys the subject

Craig Paterson 3. Director and Consultant, Bioethics World; Professor of Philosophy, Providence College. “A Life Not Worth Living?” *Studies in Christian Ethics* 16: 1-20. Emory Libraries.

Contrary to those accounts, I would argue that it is death per se that is really the objective evil for us, not because it deprives us of a prospective future of overall good judged better than the alternative of non-being. It cannot be about harm to a former person who has ceased to exist, for no person actually suffers from the sub-sequent non-participation. Rather, death in itself is an evil to us because it ontologically destroys the current existent subject — it is the ultimate in metaphysical lightening strikes. 80 The evil of death is truly an ontological evil borne by the person who already exists, independently of calculations about better or worse possible lives. Such an evil need not be consciously experienced in order to be an evil for the kind of being a human person is. Death is an evil because of the change in kind it brings about, a change that is destructive of the type of entity that we essentially are. Anything, whether caused naturally or caused by human intervention (intentional or unintentional) that drastically interferes in the process of maintaining the person in existence is an objective evil for the person. What is crucially at stake here, and is dialectically supportive of the self-evidency of the basic good of human life, is that death is a radical interference with the current life process of the kind of being that we are. In consequence, death itself can be credibly thought of as a ‘primitive evil’ for all persons, regardless of the extent to which they are currently or prospectively capable of participating in a full array of the goods of life. 81 In conclusion, concerning willed human actions, it is justifiable to state that any intentional rejection of human life itself cannot therefore be warranted since it is an expression of an ultimate disvalue for the subject, namely, the destruction of the present person; a radical ontological good that we cannot begin to weigh objectively against the travails of life in a rational manner. To deal with the sources of disvalue (pain, suffering, etc.) we should not seek to irrationally destroy the person, the very source and condition of all human possibility.

#### 3] Independently, extinction is the upmost moral evil and disavowal of the risk makes it more likely.

Burns 17 (Elizabeth Finneron-Burns is a Teaching Fellow at the University of Warwick and an Affiliated Researcher at the Institute for Futures Studies in Stockholm, What’s wrong with human extinction?, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00455091.2016.1278150?needAccess=true>, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2017)

Many, though certainly not all, people might believe that it would be wrong to bring about the end of the human species, and the reasons given for this belief are various. I begin by considering four reasons that could be given against the moral permissibility of human extinction. I will argue that only those reasons that impact the people who exist at the time that the extinction or the knowledge of the upcoming extinction occurs, can explain its wrongness. I use this conclusion to then consider in which cases human extinction would be morally permissible or impermissible, arguing that there is only a small class of cases in which it would not be wrong to cause the extinction of the human race or allow it to happen. 2.1. It would prevent the existence of very many happy people One reason of human extinction might be considered to be wrong lies in the value of human life itself. The thought here might be that it is a good thing for people to exist and enjoy happy lives and extinction would deprive more people of enjoying this good. The ‘good’ in this case could be understood in at least two ways. According to the first, one might believe that you benefit a person by bringing them into existence, or at least, that it is good for that person that they come to exist. The second view might hold that if humans were to go extinct, the utility foregone by the billions (or more) of people who could have lived but will now never get that opportunity, renders allowing human extinction to take place an incidence of wrongdoing. An example of this view can be found in two quotes from an Effective Altruism blog post by Peter Singer, Nick Beckstead and Matt Wage: One very bad thing about human extinction would be that billions of people would likely die painful deaths. But in our view, this is by far not the worst thing about human extinction. The worst thing about human extinction is that there would be no future generations. Since there could be so many generations in our future, the value of all those generations together greatly exceeds the value of the current generation. (Beckstead, Singer, and Wage 2013) The authors are making two claims. The first is that there is value in human life and also something valuable about creating future people which gives us a reason to do so; furthermore, it would be a very bad thing if we did not do so. The second is that, not only would it be a bad thing for there to be no future people, but it would actually be the worst thing about extinction. Since happy human lives have value, and the number of potential people who could ever exist is far greater than the number of people who exist at any one time, even if the extinction were brought about through the painful deaths of currently existing people, the former’s loss would be greater than the latter’s. Both claims are assuming that there is an intrinsic value in the existence of potential human life. The second claim makes the further assumption that the forgone value of the potential lives that could be lived is greater than the disvalue that would be accrued by people existing at the time of the extinction through suffering from painful and/or premature deaths. The best-known author of the post, Peter Singer is a prominent utilitarian, so it is not surprising that he would lament the potential lack of future human lives per se. However, it is not just utilitarians who share this view, even if implicitly. Indeed, other philosophers also seem to imply that they share the intuition that there is just something wrong with causing or failing to prevent the extinction of the human species such that we prevent more ‘people’ from having the ‘opportunity to exist’. Stephen Gardiner (2009) and Martin O’Neill (personal correspondence), both sympathetic to contract theory, for example, also find it intuitive that we should want more generations to have the opportunity to exist, assuming that they have worth-living lives, and I find it plausible to think that many other people (philosophers and non-philosophers alike) probably share this intuition. When we talk about future lives being ‘prevented’, we are saying that a possible person or a set of possible people who could potentially have existed will now never actually come to exist. To say that it is wrong to prevent people from existing could either mean that a possible person could reasonably reject a principle that permitted us not to create them, or that the foregone value of their lives provides a reason for rejecting any principle that permits extinction. To make the first claim we would have to argue that a possible person could reasonably reject any principle that prevented their existence on the grounds that it prevented them in particular from existing. However, this is implausible for two reasons. First, we can only wrong someone who did, does or will actually exist because wronging involves failing to take a person’s interests into account. When considering the permissibility of a principle allowing us not to create Person X, we cannot take X’s interest in being created into account because X will not exist if we follow the principle. By considering the standpoint of a person in our deliberations we consider the burdens they will have to bear as a result of the principle. In this case, there is no one who will bear any burdens since if the principle is followed (that is, if we do not create X), X will not exist to bear any burdens. So, only people who do/will actually exist can bear the brunt of a principle, and therefore occupy a standpoint that is owed justification. Second, existence is not an interest at all and a possible person is not disadvantaged by not being caused to exist. Rather than being an interest, it is a necessary requirement in order to have interests. Rivka Weinberg describes it as ‘neutral’ because causing a person to exist is to create a subject who can have interests; existence is not an interest itself.3 In order to be disadvantaged, there must be some detrimental effect on your interests. However, without existence, a person does not have any interests so they cannot be disadvantaged by being kept out of existence. But, as Weinberg points out, ‘never having interests itself could not be contrary to people’s interests since without interest bearers, there can be no ‘they’ for it to be bad for’ (Weinberg 2008, 13). So, a principle that results in some possible people never becoming actual does not impose any costs on those ‘people’ because nobody is disadvantaged by not coming into existence.4 It therefore seems that it cannot be wrong to fail to bring particular people into existence. This would mean that no one acts wrongly when they fail to create another person. Writ large, it would also not be wrong if everybody decided to exercise their prerogative not to create new people and potentially, by consequence, allow human extinction. One might respond here by saying that although it may be permissible for one person to fail to create a new person, it is not permissible if everyone chooses to do so because human lives have value and allowing human extinction would be to forgo a huge amount of value in the world. This takes us to the second way of understanding the potential wrongness of preventing people from existing — the foregone value of a life provides a reason for rejecting any principle that prevents it. One possible reply to this claim turns on the fact that many philosophers acknowledge that the only, or at least the best, way to think about the value of (individual or groups of) possible people’s lives is in impersonal terms (Parfit 1984; Reiman 2007; McMahan 2009). Jeff McMahan, for example, writes ‘at the time of one’s choice there is no one who exists or will exist independently of that choice for whose sake one could be acting in causing him or her to exist … it seems therefore that any reason to cause or not to cause an individual to exist … is best considered an impersonal rather than individual-affecting reason’ (McMahan 2009, 52). Another reply along similar lines would be to appeal to the value that is lost or at least foregone when we fail to bring into existence a next (or several next) generations of people with worth-living lives. Since ex hypothesi worth-living lives have positive value, it is better to create more such lives and worse to create fewer. Human extinction by definition is the creation of no future lives and would ‘deprive’ billions of ‘people’ of the opportunity to live worth-living lives. This might reduce the amount of value in the world at the time of the extinction (by killing already existing people), but it would also prevent a much vaster amount of value in the future (by failing to create more people). Both replies depend on the impersonal value of human life. However, recall that in contractualism impersonal values are not on their own grounds for reasonably rejecting principles. Scanlon himself says that although we have a strong reason not to destroy existing human lives, this reason ‘does not flow from the thought that it is a good thing for there to be more human life rather than less’ (104). In contractualism, something cannot be wrong unless there is an impact on a person. Thus, neither the impersonal value of creating a particular person nor the impersonal value of human life writ large could on its own provide a reason for rejecting a principle permitting human extinction. It seems therefore that the fact that extinction would deprive future people of the opportunity to live worth-living lives (either by failing to create either particular future people or future people in general) cannot provide us with a reason to consider human extinction to be wrong. Although the lost value of these ‘lives’ itself cannot be the reason explaining the wrongness of extinction, it is possible the knowledge of this loss might create a personal reason for some existing people. I will consider this possibility later on in section (d). But first I move to the second reason human extinction might be wrong per se. 2.2. It would mean the loss of the only known form of intelligent life and all civilization and intellectual progress would be lost A second reason we might think it would be wrong to cause human extinction is the loss that would occur of the only (known) form of rational life and the knowledge and civilization that that form of life has created. One thought here could be that just as some might consider it wrong to destroy an individual human heritage monument like the Sphinx, it would also be wrong if the advances made by humans over the past few millennia were lost or prevented from progressing. A related argument is made by those who feel that there is something special about humans’ capacity for rationality which is valuable in itself. Since humans are the only intelligent life that we know of, it would be a loss, in itself, to the world for that to end. I admit that I struggle to fully appreciate this thought. It seems to me that Henry Sidgwick was correct in thinking that these things are only important insofar as they are important to humans (Sidgwick 1874, I.IX.4).5 If there is no form of intelligent life in the future, who would there be to lament its loss since intelligent life is the only form of life capable of appreciating intelligence? Similarly, if there is no one with the rational capacity to appreciate historic monuments and civil progress, who would there be to be negatively affected or even notice the loss?6 However, even if there is nothing special about human rationality, just as some people try to prevent the extinction of nonhuman animal species, we might think that we ought also to prevent human extinction for the sake of biodiversity. The thought in this, as well as the earlier examples, must be that it would somehow be bad for the world if there were no more humans even though there would be no one for whom it is bad. This may be so but the only way to understand this reason is impersonally. Since we are concerned with wrongness rather than badness, we must ask whether something that impacts no one’s well-being, status or claims can be wrong. As we saw earlier, in the contractualist framework reasons must be personal rather than impersonal in order to provide grounds for reasonable rejection (Scanlon 1998, 218–223). Since the loss of civilization, intelligent life or biodiversity are per se impersonal reasons, there is no standpoint from which these reasons could be used to reasonably reject a principle that permitted extinction. Therefore, causing human extinction on the grounds of the loss of civilization, rational life or biodiversity would not be wrong. 2.3. Existing people would endure physical pain and/or painful and/or premature deaths Thinking about the ways in which human extinction might come about brings to the fore two more reasons it might be wrong. It could, for example, occur if all humans (or at least the critical number needed to be unable to replenish the population, leading to eventual extinction) underwent a sterilization procedure. Or perhaps it could come about due to anthropogenic climate change or a massive asteroid hitting the Earth and wiping out the species in the same way it did the dinosaurs millions of years ago. Each of these scenarios would involve significant physical and/or non-physical harms to existing people and their interests. Physically, people might suffer premature and possibly also painful deaths, for example. It is not hard to imagine examples in which the process of extinction could cause premature death. A nuclear winter that killed everyone or even just every woman under the age of 50 is a clear example of such a case. Obviously, some types of premature death themselves cannot be reasons to reject a principle. Every person dies eventually, sometimes earlier than the standard expected lifespan due to accidents or causes like spontaneously occurring incurable cancers. A cause such as disease is not a moral agent and therefore it cannot be wrong if it unavoidably kills a person prematurely. Scanlon says that the fact that a principle would reduce a person’s well-being gives that person a reason to reject the principle: ‘components of well-being figure prominently as grounds for reasonable rejection’ (Scanlon 1998, 214). However, it is not settled yet whether premature death is a setback to well-being. Some philosophers hold that death is a harm to the person who dies, whilst others argue that it is not.7 I will argue, however, that regardless of who is correct in that debate, being caused to die prematurely can be reason to reject a principle when it fails to show respect to the person as a rational agent. Scanlon says that recognizing others as rational beings with interests involves seeing reason to preserve life and prevent death: ‘appreciating the value of human life is primarily a matter of seeing human lives as something to be respected, where this involves seeing reasons not to destroy them, reasons to protect them, and reasons to want them to go well’ (Scanlon 1998, 104). The ‘respect for life’ in this case is a respect for the person living, not respect for human life in the abstract. This means that we can sometimes fail to protect human life without acting wrongfully if we still respect the person living. Scanlon gives the example of a person who faces a life of unending and extreme pain such that she wishes to end it by committing suicide. Scanlon does not think that the suicidal person shows a lack of respect for her own life by seeking to end it because the person whose life it is has no reason to want it to go on. This is important to note because it emphasizes the fact that the respect for human life is person-affecting. It is not wrong to murder because of the impersonal disvalue of death in general, but because taking someone’s life without their permission shows disrespect to that person. This supports its inclusion as a reason in the contractualist formula, regardless of what side ends up winning the ‘is death a harm?’ debate because even if death turns out not to harm the person who died, ending their life without their consent shows disrespect to that person. A person who could reject a principle permitting another to cause his or her premature death presumably does not wish to die at that time, or in that manner. Thus, if they are killed without their consent, their interests have not been taken into account, and they have a reason to reject the principle that allowed their premature death.8 This is as true in the case of death due to extinction as it is for death due to murder. However, physical pain may also be caused to existing people without killing them, but still resulting in human extinction. Imagine, for example, surgically removing everyone’s reproductive organs in order to prevent the creation of any future people. Another example could be a nuclear bomb that did not kill anyone, but did painfully render them infertile through illness or injury. These would be cases in which physical pain (through surgery or bombs) was inflicted on existing people and the extinction came about as a result of the painful incident rather than through death. Furthermore, one could imagine a situation in which a bomb (for example) killed enough people to cause extinction, but some people remained alive, but in terrible pain from injuries. It seems uncontroversial that the infliction of physical pain could be a reason to reject a principle. Although Scanlon says that an impact on well-being is not the only reason to reject principles, it plays a significant role, and indeed, most principles are likely to be rejected due to a negative impact on a person’s well-being, physical or otherwise. It may be queried here whether it is actually the involuntariness of the pain that is grounds for reasonable rejection rather than the physical pain itself because not all pain that a person suffers is involuntary. One can imagine acts that can cause physical pain that are not rejectable — base jumping or life-saving or improving surgery, for example. On the other hand, pushing someone off a cliff or cutting him with a scalpel against his will are clearly rejectable acts. The difference between the two cases is that in the former, the person having the pain inflicted has consented to that pain or risk of pain. My view is that they cannot be separated in these cases and it is involuntary physical pain that is the grounds for reasonable rejection. Thus, the fact that a principle would allow unwanted physical harm gives a person who would be subjected to that harm a reason to reject the principle. Of course the mere fact that a principle causes involuntary physical harm or premature death is not sufficient to declare that the principle is rejectable — there might be countervailing reasons. In the case of extinction, what countervailing reasons might be offered in favour of the involuntary physical pain/ death-inducing harm? One such reason that might be offered is that humans are a harm to the natural environment and that the world might be a better place if there were no humans in it. It could be that humans might rightfully be considered an all-things-considered hindrance to the world rather than a benefit to it given the fact that we have been largely responsible for the extinction of many species, pollution and, most recently, climate change which have all negatively affected the natural environment in ways we are only just beginning to understand. Thus, the fact that human extinction would improve the natural environment (or at least prevent it from degrading further), is a countervailing reason in favour of extinction to be weighed against the reasons held by humans who would experience physical pain or premature death. However, the good of the environment as described above is by definition not a personal reason. Just like the loss of rational life and civilization, therefore, it cannot be a reason on its own when determining what is wrong and countervail the strong personal reasons to avoid pain/death that is held by the people who would suffer from it.9 Every person existing at the time of the extinction would have a reason to reject that principle on the grounds of the physical pain they are being forced to endure against their will that could not be countervailed by impersonal considerations such as the negative impact humans may have on the earth. Therefore, a principle that permitted extinction to be accomplished in a way that caused involuntary physical pain or premature death could quite clearly be rejectable by existing people with no relevant countervailing reasons. This means that human extinction that came about in this way would be wrong. There are of course also additional reasons they could reject a similar principle which I now turn to address in the next section. 2.4. Existing people could endure non-physical harms I said earlier than the fact in itself that there would not be any future people is an impersonal reason and can therefore not be a reason to reject a principle permitting extinction. However, this impersonal reason could give rise to a personal reason that is admissible. So, the final important reason people might think that human extinction would be wrong is that there could be various deleterious psychological effects that would be endured by existing people having the knowledge that there would be no future generations. There are two main sources of this trauma, both arising from the knowledge that there will be no more people. The first relates to individual people and the undesired negative effect on well-being that would be experienced by those who would have wanted to have children. Whilst this is by no means universal, it is fair to say that a good proportion of people feel a strong pull towards reproduction and having their lineage continue in some way. Samuel Scheffler describes the pull towards reproduction as a ‘desire for a personalized relationship with the future’ (Scheffler 2012, 31). Reproducing is a widely held desire and the joys of parenthood are ones that many people wish to experience. For these people knowing that they would not have descendants (or that their descendants will endure painful and/or premature deaths) could create a sense of despair and pointlessness of life. Furthermore, the inability to reproduce and have your own children because of a principle/policy that prevents you (either through bans or physical interventions) would be a significant infringement of what we consider to be a basic right to control what happens to your body. For these reasons, knowing that you will have no descendants could cause significant psychological traumas or harms even if there were no associated physical harm. The second is a more general, higher level sense of hopelessness or despair that there will be no more humans and that your projects will end with you. Even those who did not feel a strong desire to procreate themselves might feel a sense of hopelessness that any projects or goals they have for the future would not be fulfilled. Many of the projects and goals we work towards during our lifetime are also at least partly future-oriented. Why bother continuing the search for a cure for cancer if either it will not be found within humans’ lifetime, and/or there will be no future people to benefit from it once it is found? Similar projects and goals that might lose their meaning when confronted with extinction include politics, artistic pursuits and even the type of philosophical work with which this paper is concerned. Even more extreme, through the words of the character Theo Faron, P.D. James says in his novel The Children of Men that ‘without the hope of posterity for our race if not for ourselves, without the assurance that we being dead yet live, all pleasures of the mind and senses sometimes seem to me no more than pathetic and crumbling defences shored up against our ruins’ (James 2006, 9). Even if James’ claim is a bit hyperbolic and all pleasures would not actually be lost, I agree with Scheffler in finding it not implausible that the knowledge that extinction was coming and that there would be no more people would have at least a general depressive effect on people’s motivation and confidence in the value of and joy in their activities (Scheffler 2012, 43). Both sources of psychological harm are personal reasons to reject a principle that permitted human extinction. Existing people could therefore reasonably reject the principle for either of these reasons. Psychological pain and the inability to pursue your personal projects, goals, and aims, are all acceptable reasons for rejecting principles in the contractualist framework. So too are infringements of rights and entitlements that we accept as important for people’s lives. These psychological reasons, then, are also valid reasons to reject principles that permitted or required human extinction.

#### Even if they model US antitrust law now, they won’t post-aff.

Ma. Joy V. Abrenica 18. Professor, School of Economics, University of the Philippines Diliman. BALANCING CONSUMER WELFARE AND PUBLIC INTEREST IN COMPETITION LAW. 13:2 Asian J WTO & Int'l Health L & Pol'y 443. 2018. Pg 449-452

Fourth, considering the wide variation in public interest clauses across jurisdictions, their inclusion in competition laws could cause further divergence in competition enforcement. This comes at the heels of increasing alignment of competition laws with the U.S. and EC regimes, and growing number of preferential trade agreements with competition provisions. Trade and competition policies have natural nexus, hence there is significant interest in harmonizing competition enforcement. Policy divergence, and the legal uncertainty and market unpredictability that it creates, adds to the cost of businesses operating across several borders, thereby impeding global trade and investments. Additionally, the market inefficiencies produced when competition objectives are subordinated to public interest objectives, do not remain in the domestic market, but eventually diffuse to the global economy.

#### EU antitrust trumps globally---NOT the US.

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The EU and the US not only have their regulatory differences, but they also want the rest of the world to follow their respective regulatory models. Both jurisdictions have actively promoted their competition laws as “best practices” abroad, urging developed and developing countries alike to adopt domestic competition laws and build institutions to enforce them (Kovacic 2015; Tappan and Byers 2013; Kovacic 2008; Fox 1997). They promote their models through a specialized network of competition regulators—the International Competition Network (ICN)—and also more general bodies—notably the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) (Tritell and Kraus 2018). They also employ bilateral tools in their promotion effort—including offering technical assistance to emerging competition law jurisdictions (Tritell and Kraus 2018). In its trade agreements, the EU also explicitly conditions access to its markets on the adoption of a competition law, exporting its own law in the process (Bradford and Chilton 2019), while the US relies primarily in its persuasive powers rather than on formal treaties in exporting its laws (Kovacic 2015). There are multiple motivations for states to seek export their laws abroad. For one, having the rest of the world replicate one’s regulatory framework lowers the costs of entering foreign markets. The regulatory similarity with the EU is expected to lower the entry costs for EU companies to those third markets given that the EU companies already comply with similar standards at home. For the same reason, the US prefers to export its model and hence avoid adjustment costs that its companies may face when confronted with regulatory differences. For another, exporting one’s rules ensures that competition takes place on “optimal,” “efficient,” or “fair” terms across the global markets—as defined by the jurisdiction that successfully exports its laws. Finally, the winner of the regulatory race is able to export its economic philosophy to third countries, which serves as a testament to the appeal of that jurisdiction’s value system. In case of competition law, the countries’ choice of aligning themselves with the EU or the US reflects a more fundamental choice between an ideology that either places greater trust in the governments’ ability to improve outcomes through intervention (EU model) or, alternatively, trust in the markets’ ability to self-correct (US model). These efforts to globalize competition law appear, at first glance, largely successful: today, over 130 jurisdictions have a domestic competition law, making competition law one of the most widespread forms of economic regulation around the world. But, because the EU and US competition laws differ in key respects, understanding the type of competition law a country has adopted is critical to understanding which country is having greater influence. For example, whereas promoting consumer welfare is the goal of US antitrust law, EU competition law has historically allowed additional goals to enter the analysis, including the protection of small and medium enterprises, employment, regional development, and, most critically, market integration. Moreover, the EU is generally more likely to find that a company is abusing its dominant position in a market and to challenge vertical and conglomerate mergers. In addition, the EU and US competition enforcement institutions differ dramatically: EU law is dominated by administrative actions and US law is dominated by private litigants. And whereas the EU relies on administrative fines, US antitrust law is also backed by criminal sanctions. While competition law scholars are familiar with the major differences between the EU and US regimes, and with individual examples of countries emulating the EU or the US, the relative influence of each regime has not been studied quantitatively. By leveraging a novel and highly detailed data coding of competition statutes around the world, this article is the first systematic study the relative influence of EU and US competition regimes in shaping the global regulatory landscape. Using data on dozens of competition law provisions from 126 countries, we trace the evolution of competition regimes for over a half a century of lawmaking, from when the EU joined the US as another major competition regulator in the world in 1957 to 2010. Our analyses reveal that the majority of jurisdictions with competition law regimes have laws that more closely resemble the European Union’s competition laws than the United States’ antitrust laws. Moreover, our detailed data allows us to trace the evolution of EU and US influence over time. This analysis reveals that the European model of competition became more emulated than United States’ model in the 1990s, and the EU’s “sphere of influence” in the domain of competition regulation has continued to increase ever since. Thus, the significant diffusion of competition rules we have witnessed over the past three decades has not only led to a globalization of competition law, but also to a notable “Europeanization” of competition regulation across the world markets. The Europeanization, rather the Americanization, of global competition law is notable because the US has a considerably longer history of using competition law. Indeed, the United States the Sherman Act long before the EU and its competition laws were conceived. The US has also been an influential leader in competition economics and law alike, spearheading early efforts to adopt competition law regimes in many parts of the world—including in the EU. However, after the EU adopted its own competition law, it eventually eclipsed the US as the leader in providing the template for the global expansion of competition laws, marginalizing the US’s global influence in the decades that followed. In other fields, such as corporate law, thousands of articles have been devoted to debating whether there’s a race to the top or the bottom, what mechanisms drive the race, whether shareholders or managers benefit, and more (e.g., Romano 1987; Roe 2003).11 However, because the literature on the world’s competition regimes is in its infancy, a key contribution of this article is to document that there exists a global regulatory race in the area of competition law, and that the EU is clearly winning it. We also advance a set of explanations for why the European model has come to predominate. First, a set of “push factors” explains the EU’s ability to effectively externalize its laws. The EU’s competition law dominance can be partially traced to the EU’s conscious efforts to expand its regulations through a myriad of trade, association, and other political agreements. The EU has required many countries seeking greater market access or closer political association to adopt competition laws. In addition, as Bradford (2012) outlines in “The Brussels Effect,” the EU has the greatest ability to shape foreign jurisdictions’ laws given that the companies often apply the most stringent regulatory standard—typically the EU standard—across their global operations to capture the benefits of uniform production while maintaining compliance worldwide. Second, the EU competition law model also spreads due to strong “pull factors.” In many countries, domestic politics are more conducive to EU-style competition laws, which accommodate more diverse policy goals and defer less to markets and more to governments’ ability to correct market failures. Another major pull factor is the EU’s tendency to promulgate more precise and detailed rules, making them easier to copy in the absence of technical expertise in the adopting country. Our findings have several implications. First, our results offer evidence of the EU’s outsized influence in regulating global markets. This narrative stands in contrast to many critics who have declared the end of the EU’s influence and ability to shape outcomes globally as its relative economic and political power wanes. Second, our results suggest that, although the law and economics movement may have had a large influence on the development of America’s antitrust law and policy, it may have had a more modest influence on the development of competition policy in the rest of the world (Bradford et al. 2020). Third, and more generally, our analysis illustrates the ability of a single jurisdiction to attract countries with starkly different characteristics into its orbit, vesting it with a sizable regulatory influence that spans economic, linguistic, and political boundaries. Out of this dynamic, a new form of globalization of norms emerges—globalization emerging as a result of EU’s unilateralism as opposed to multilateralism. Finally, beyond illuminating the regulatory influence in the competition law context, our results speak more broadly to the literature on regulatory competition, diffusion of norms, and legal transplants. Competition between the European and US regulatory schemes has been prominent in many areas, ranging from privacy (Schwartz 2013; Schwartz and Peifer 2017), to chemicals (Scott 2009), to finance (Gadinis 2010), to discrimination law (Linos 2010), to name but a few. Documenting the specific pathways through which the EU has succeeded in externalizing its models thus contributes to a broad range of fields and advances the diffusion literature, which to date has primarily focused on countries receiving foreign models and not on the entities promoting them.

#### 1] Decline fuels nationalism---great power war

Lawrence H. **Summers** **17**. Secretary of the Treasury (1999-2001) and Director of the US National Economic Council (2009-2010), former president of Harvard University, where he is currently University Professor. “Will the Center Hold?” *Project Syndicate*. 12/21/2017. <https://www.project-syndicate.org/onpoint/recession-or-financial-crisis-political-fallout-by-lawrence-h--summers-2017-12?a_la=english&a_d=5a37edac78b6c709b8d260dd&a_m=&a_a=click&a_s=&a_p=%2Fsection%2Feconomics&a_li=recession-or-financial-crisis-political-fallout-by-lawrence-h--summers-2017-12&a_pa=section-commentaries&a_ps>=

There is also the question of financial institutions’ health. While major firms appear far better capitalized and far more liquid than they were prior to the crisis, market indicators of risk suggest we may not be quite as far out of the woods as many suppose. Despite apparently large increases in capital and consequent declines in leverage, it does not appear that bank stocks have become far less volatile, as financial theory would predict if capital had become abundant. Financial markets are widely cited, including by US President Donald Trump, as providing comfort in the current moment. But a relapse into **financial crisis** would likely have **catastrophic** political **consequences**, sweeping into power even more **toxic populist nationalists**. In such a scenario, the center **will not hold**. Beyond the kind of near-term risks that markets price, there is the question of an economic downturn. The good news is that sentiment is positive in most of the world. Inflation seems unlikely to accelerate out of control and force a lurch toward contractionary fiscal and monetary policies. Most forecasters regard the near-term risk of recession as low. But recessions are never predicted successfully, even six months in advance. The current expansion in the US has gone on for a long time, and the risk of policy mistakes there is very real, owing to highly problematic economic leadership in the Trump administration. I would put the annual probability of recession in the coming years at 20-25%. So the odds are better than even that the US economy will fall into recession in the next three years. The risk from a purely economic point of view is that the traditional strategy for battling recession – a reduction of 500 basis points in the federal funds rate – will be unavailable this year, given the zero lower bound on interest rates. Nor is it clear that the will or the room for fiscal expansion will exist. This means that the next recession, like the last, may well be **protracted and deep**, with **severe** global consequences. And the political capacity for a global response, like that on display at the London G-20 Summit in 2009, appears to be **absent** as well. Just compare the global visions of US President Barack Obama and UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown back then with those of Trump and Prime Minister Theresa May today. I shudder to think what a serious recession will mean for politics and policy. It is hard to imagine avoiding a resurgence of **protectionism, populism, and scapegoating**. In such a scenario, as with another financial crisis, the center will not hold. But the greatest risk in the next few years, I believe, is neither a market meltdown nor a recession. It is instead a **political doom loop** in which voters’ conclusion that government does not work effectively for them becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. Candidates elected on platforms of resentment delegitimize the governments they lead, fueling further resentment and even more problematic new leaders. Cynicism pervades. How else can one explain how the candidacy of Roy Moore for a US Senate seat? Moore, who was twice dismissed for cause from his post on the Alabama Supreme Court, and who is credibly charged with sexually assaulting teenage girls when he was in his 30s, could enter the US Senate as many of his colleagues look the other way. If a country’s citizens lose confidence in their government’s ability to improve their lives, the government has an incentive to **rally popular support** by focusing attention on threats that only it can address. That is why in societies pervaded by anger and uncertainty about the future, the temptation to stigmatize minority groups increases. And it is why there is a tendency for officials to **magnify foreign threats**. We are seeing this phenomenon all over the world. Russian President Vladimir Putin, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and Chinese President Xi Jinping have all made nationalism a central part of their governing strategy. So, too, has Trump, who has explicitly rejected the international community in favor of the idea that there is only a ceaseless struggle among nation-states for competitive advantage. When the world’s preeminent power, having upheld the idea of international community for nearly 75 years, rejects it in favor of ad hoc deal making, others have no choice but to follow suit. Countries that can no longer rely on the US feel pressure to provide for their own security. America’s adversaries inevitably will seek to **fill the voids** left behind as the US **retrenches**.

#### 2] Decline causes diversionary wars—robust statistical proof

Patrick HOWELL 13. Graduate Student, International Affairs, University of Georgia; BA, International Studies, Emory. “Economic Crises and the Initiation of Militarized Disputes.” Thesis. <https://getd.libs.uga.edu/pdfs/howell_patrick_d_201305_ma.pdf>.

The findings are clear: economic crises are an important trigger for shifts in a state’s rate of dispute initiation. By using a large sample of states over a period of 185 years, this conclusion then can also be taken as generalizable to the entire population of states in the international system. In addition to providing support for issue crossover and the influence economic troubles can play on foreign policy decisions, the findings here also support the methodological rationale for using economic crises as explicit, observable events, instead of as trends in other variables (e.g. GDP growth). Of course, this is not to say that all work on this topic is final. There exist a number of areas where this research agenda can be improved upon and/or extended to in order to provide a more holistic account of where and how economic crises exactly apply political pressure on leaders.

First, the study of diversionary war exists in both quantitative tests and in more fine-toothed examinations of actual cases (Levy and Vakili 1992; Fravel 2010). Exploring the internal processes within states in such a fashion can also produce a deeper understanding of the exact causal mechanisms through which prospect theory operates. Aggregation and levels of analysis become a basic concern with applying prospect theory outside of the laboratory and to states and governments. After all, “prospect theory is developed as a theory of individual decision making, the question is whether it is applicable to collective decision making” (Vis 2011, 337). Here a unitary actor assumption is made from the outset, but it is also possible that the observed effect is driven instead by individual decision-makers themselves (for example, Fuhrmann and Early 2008, who keep the level of analysis only on President Bush). A deeper case study of a few select cases with an eye towards process might reveal whether the increase in conflict initiation is due to a single policy entrepreneur or leader, or if it is the result of collective behavior (as perhaps even aides, legislators, and bureaucrats seek to compensate for the detrimental effects that accompany an economic crisis separately or in concert).

Examination of specific cases might also provide a more accurate picture for policymakers of the strategy that can accompany an economic crisis and inducement of diversionary tendencies in another state. Smith (Smith 1998) hypothesizes diversionary actions as a strategic game, and finds that potential target states should then adopt a policy of strategic avoidance – disengaging from any scenario that might make them a target from a diversionary conflict initiated by an opposing state in dire straits. This question of strategic avoidance occurs most often in the study of the United States (Fordham 2005; Meernik 2005), with evidence that other states avoid and/or initiate fewer disputes with the United States when the American economy is performing poorly. The empirical test here using a proportionbased dependent variable might already be capturing some degree of a strategic avoidance effect, in that some of the variation in the proportion of initiation could be because the rate of other states initiating disputes on the crisis-stricken state is decreasing. If strategic avoidance is occurring, it actually increases the strength of aspects of the diversionary war literature (in that other states are actually behaving according to expectations of diversionary actions), but much more work and nuance would be needed to separate where then the logic in strategic avoiders is originating.

The final implication of the findings to be discussed here is the role of institutions in this analysis. As stated above, the institutional controls that were included in the estimation demonstrated null effects on the overall rate of militarized dispute initiation. This finding is interesting considering the enshrined role that institutions and regime types tend to play within scholarly work on diversionary war. Similar to the mixed results of GDP indicators, mixed and contradictory results can be found throughout the body of work on diversionary war: some find that the diversionary effects exist mainly in democratic settings (Gelpi 1997; Davies 2002; Brul´e and Williams 2009), while others find that diversionary effects occur in autocratic settings (Miller 1999; Lai and Slater 2005; Pickering and Kisangani 2010).

One method of reconciling the conflicting conclusions of whether democratic or autocratic leaders are more likely to engage in diversionary behavior is in direct tests comparing the two regime types. Typically, these comparisons have either found the two regime types differ in the targets that are selected by each (Bueno De Mesquita and Siverson 1995), or have found some fault with the way that the regime types themselves are defined, due to differing incentives for differing subtypes of regimes (Pickering and Kisangani 2005). In order to examine the difference between democracies and autocracies, I split the sample from Model 2 into either of the regime types, using a score of 6 in the Polity2 measure as a cut-point. Splitting the sample has the effect of interacting regime type with all independent variables, giving regime specific effects not only for economic crises, but also all control variables.1

The results of this regime split can be found in Table 2. As can be seen here, the effect of economic crises is positive and significant in both institutional settings. Comparing the coefficients for economic crisis in Table 2 with those of the original Model 2, the likely explanation for why the institutional variables in the original model did not have an impact on crisis initiation is because all democracies and autocracies possess relatively similar incentives for increasing crisis initiation following economic crises, so any variation across institutions was only averaged out. However, the results presented in Table 2 also provide support for a difference existing in the process of how diversionary conflict might occur in either regime type, due to the differences in control variable significance. This lends some credence to the separation of democracies and autocracies for study of diversionary war, but provides no evidence that the effect should only exist in one or the other. The similarity in the main independent variable of economic crises, though, furthers the assertion that the effect of economic crises increasing dispute initiation can be viewed as a general behavior of all states in the international system.

Conclusions

Altogether, there can be said to be a robust, positive relationship between the occurrence of economic crises and the rate of dispute initiation by states. This effect is especially strong and demonstrable when time ordering is preserved by examining how crises in the previous year affect states in their current year. These findings can also be said to have a relatively high degree of substantive import as well. As Figure 1 showed, the occurrence of each subsequent economic crisis increases the chances of a state initiating disputes by almost 3%. The nearly 20 percentage point increase in dispute initiation across the range of the lagged economic crisis variable also represents a substantial impact, especially considering the rare event nature of militarized disputes to begin with.

This generalizable finding can have far-reaching impact to both the study of diversionary war in academia, as well as directly for policymakers. In academe settings, there is good evidence to support the use of acute economic crises over those variables based on the slowershifting trends of GDP or public opinion measurements. Economic crises act as an explicit trigger that can mark a leader’s shift into a losses frame and engage in riskier behavior consistent with both prospect theory and diversionary war hypotheses. Meanwhile, applying this observed effect to the real world would seem to indicate that if a state goes through an economic crisis, other states should have increased wariness in their dealings with the crisis-stricken state and/or be more prepared for the possibility of a new dispute emerging in the wake of such an event.

#### Cap solves war---Interdependence prevents nuclear war.

Stein TØNNESSON 15. Research Professor, Peace Research Institute Oslo; Leader of East Asia Peace program, Uppsala University. “Deterrence, interdependence and Sino–US peace.” *International Area Studies Review* 18(3): 297-311. Emory Libraries.

Several recent works on China and Sino–US relations have made substantial contributions to the current understanding of how and under what circumstances a combination of nuclear deterrence and economic interdependence may reduce the risk of war between major powers. At least four conclusions can be drawn from the review above: first, those who say that interdependence may both inhibit and drive conflict are right. Interdependence raises the cost of conflict for all sides but asymmetrical or unbalanced dependencies and negative trade expectations may generate tensions leading to trade wars among interdependent states that in turn increase the risk of military conflict (Copeland, 2015: 1, 14, 437; Roach, 2014). The risk may increase if one of the interdependent countries is governed by an inward-looking socio-economic coalition (Solingen, 2015); second, the risk of war between China and the US should not just be analysed bilaterally but include their allies and partners. Third party countries could drag China or the US into confrontation; third, in this context it is of some comfort that the three main economic powers in Northeast Asia (China, Japan and South Korea) are all deeply integrated economically through production networks within a global system of trade and finance (Ravenhill, 2014; Yoshimatsu, 2014: 576); and fourth, decisions for war and peace are taken by very few people, who act on the basis of their future expectations. International relations theory must be supplemented by foreign policy analysis in order to assess the value attributed by national decision-makers to economic development and their assessments of risks and opportunities. If leaders on either side of the Atlantic begin to seriously fear or anticipate their own nation’s decline then they may blame this on external dependence, appeal to anti-foreign sentiments, contemplate the use of force to gain respect or credibility, adopt protectionist policies, and ultimately refuse to be deterred by either nuclear arms or prospects of socioeconomic calamities. Such a dangerous shift could happen abruptly, i.e. under the instigation of actions by a third party – or against a third party.

Yet as long as there is both nuclear deterrence and interdependence, the tensions in East Asia are unlikely to escalate to war. As Chan (2013) says, all states in the region are aware that they cannot count on support from either China or the US if they make provocative moves. The greatest risk is not that a territorial dispute leads to war under present circumstances but that changes in the world economy alter those circumstances in ways that render inter-state peace more precarious. If China and the US fail to rebalance their financial and trading relations (Roach, 2014) then a trade war could result, interrupting transnational production networks, provoking social distress, and exacerbating nationalist emotions. This could have unforeseen consequences in the field of security, with nuclear deterrence remaining the only factor to protect the world from Armageddon, and unreliably so. Deterrence could lose its credibility:

one of the two great powers might gamble that the other yield in a cyber-war or conventional limited war, or third party countries might engage in conflict with each other, with a view to obliging Washington or Beijing to intervene.

#### 1] Cybernetics mean the next K-wave is the last and results in sustainability, not war.

Leonid E. GRININ ET AL. 17. \*\*Chief Research Fellow, National Research University Higher School of Economics; PhD. “Forthcoming Kondratieff wave, Cybernetic Revolution, and global ageing.” *Technological Forecasting & Social Change* 115(February): 52-68. Emory Libraries.

The sixth K-wave (about 2020 to the 2060/70s), like the first K-wave, will proceed generally during completion of the production revolution (see above). However, there is an important difference. During the first K-wave the duration of one phase of the industrial production principle significantly exceeded the duration of the whole K-wave. But now one phase of the K-wave will exceed the duration of one phase of production principle. This alone should essentially modify the course of the sixth K-wave; the seventh wave will be feebly expressed or will not occur at all (on the possibility of the other scenario see above). Such a forecast is based also on the fact that the end of the Cybernetic Revolution and distribution of its results will promote integration of the World System and a considerable growth of influence of new universal regulating mechanisms. It is quite reasonable, taking into account the fact that the forthcoming final phase of the Cybernetic Revolution will be the revolution in the regulation of systems. Thus, the management of the economy should reach a new level. K-waves appeared at a certain phase of global evolution and they are likely to disappear at its certain phase.

Change or disappearance of the long-wave cyclicality may also be supported by the intensification of the process of global ageing. By the end of the 21st century, this process will encompass almost all the countries of the world. And thanks to achievements of Cybernetic Revolution the life expectancy is likely to be significantly higher than today even in developed countries. But accordingly one should take into account the point that elderly populations are much more conservative. This conservatism is very likely to be a certain obstacle to the high rate of technological progress.

Thus, ironically, though over the next few decades the population ageing will contribute to technological progress, by the end of the century, it is likely to contribute to the deceleration of scientific and technological development. Thus, it is possible that the population ageing, together with the improvement of planning capabilities, may facilitate the transition of global society to a more calm and slow development (which, incidentally, may be rather close to sustainable development, of which so much is said).

## States

#### 2. It’s key to real world education. Non-uniform fiat zeroes solvency for the CP. 50 State action over antitrust has precedence.

Mark Totten 15. Mark Totten worked as an attorney with the [U.S. Department of Justice](https://ballotpedia.org/U.S._Department_of_Justice). He currently works as a criminal law professor at Michigan State University. He graduated from Yale University. “The Enforcers & the Great Recession” 06-22-2015. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=2535109

In mid-October **all fifty AGs** announced a **joint investigation** of the mortgage servicing industry.219 A **fifty-state action has precedent** but is nonetheless rare. And yet the **coalition formed** with **ease**. 220 Although the Working Group had been a policy project, it provided the infrastructure for legal action. Iowa AG Tom Miller again led the effort,221 and California, Illinois, and New York joined the Executive Committee, among other leading states. 222

## Notice and Comment

#### 1---Optimal policymaking---comparison of policymaking settings is key.

C. Scott Hemphill 09. Associate Professor and Milton Handler Fellow, Columbia Law School. “An Aggregate Approach to Antitrust: Using New Data and Rulemaking to Preserve Drug Competition”. Columbia Law Review. https://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=588125096113080096106002107108097121035031077054017013065114020077027104102087029081118107106002104019004112030074020109103121006086087059083005011081071001076076040034056104112070118104110067012020072022093015084126127025065066072121017026087065093&EXT=pdf&INDEX=TRUE

B. Antitrust Rulemaking

The previous section advocates a focused increase in the FTC’s “competition policy research and development.”174 If the FTC accepted the suggestion, it would eventually reach a firm, empirically grounded conclusion about the optimal policy for side deals, and thus either confirm or reject the conclusion reached in Part II. That conclusion could be deployed in a variety of policymaking settings, including litigation brought by the Agency, amicus practice, and advocacy for congressional legislation. This section considers a further possibility, that a comprehensive aggregate study of settlement practice could form the basis for substantive policymaking by the Agency in the form of rulemaking.

There is of course an enormous literature on the choice of courts versus agencies, adjudication versus rulemaking, and rules versus standards, and this Article does not engage the full complexity of those debates. My goal here is simply to suggest how the virtues of an aggregate perspective on settlement practice shift the balance in a way that favors agency rulemaking. In other words, the settlement issue highlights certain advantages of moving away from a court-centered model of antitrust law.

#### 2---Literature---rulemaking is an enormous debate---deleting it is unpredictable and anti-educational.

Rohit Chopra and Lina Khan 20. Rohit Chopra, Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission. And Lina M. Khan, Academic Fellow, Columbia Law School; Counsel, Subcommittee on Antitrust, Commercial, and Administrative Law, US House Committee on the Judiciary; former Legal Fellow, Federal Trade Commission. “The Case for "Unfair Methods of Competition" Rulemaking”. The University of Chicago Law Review , Vol. 87, No. 2 (March 2020), pp. 357-380. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26892415

We agree that relying solely on adjudication to define the substance of § 5 has generated persistent ambiguity. However, relying on courtroom battles to create precedents that set expectations for the marketplace is not the only vehicle through which the Commission can establish what conduct constitutes an “unfair method of competition.” The Commission has in its arsenal a far more effective tool that would provide greater notice to the marketplace and that is developed through a more transparent and participatory process: rulemaking. Through engaging in rulemaking, the Commission could define “unfair methods of competition” through processes established by the Administrative Procedure Act38 (APA).39

There is an enormous body of literature on the choice between adjudication and rulemaking, and this Essay does not seek to fully address the various trade-offs.40 Instead, our goal is to reflect on the current state of antitrust enforcement and consider ways to address the ambiguity, burdens, and democratic deficiency that we discuss above.

#### 4---Topic Education---mechanism is the most important question---sidelining it ruins antitrust policy.

Alison Jones and William E. Kovacic 20. Alison Jones, King’s College London, London, United Kingdom. William E. Kovacic, King’s College London, George Washington University, and United Kingdom Competition and Markets Authority, "Antitrust’s Implementation Blind Side: Challenges to Major Expansion of U.S. Competition Policy". SAGE Journals. 3-20-2020. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0003603X20912884 https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0003603X20912884

In this article, we do not debate the condition of competition in the U.S. economy, nor do we assess the substantive merits of the respective measures proposed to correct the market and policy deficiencies identified. Instead, we focus on a less noticed issue—the policy implementation challenges that stand between the soaring reform aspirations and their effective realization in practice. We thus take the reform recommendations—presented in scholarly papers, blue-ribbon studies, and in popular essays—at face value, and ask what legislators and policy makers must do to land them. For example, assuming that more aggressive antitrust enforcement is required, how can an effective program actually be delivered—through winning antitrust cases and securing positive change—and how can it be delivered well?

In our view, these “implementation” issues have tended to be overlooked in the modern critique and to have been too quickly side-lined as technical details to be (easily) addressed once the high-level concepts of a bold antitrust program have been settled.21 Implementation is not, however, a simple matter that will necessarily sort itself out once the intellectual architecture is in place. Rather, inattention to implementation challenges invites serious disappointment by creating a chasm between elevated policy commitments and the capacity of responsible public institutions (competition agencies, new regulators, and the courts) to produce expected outcomes. This is the implementation blindside. Unless the blindside is acknowledged and addressed, there is a significant risk that a major reform program will engage considerable resources, public and private, in initiatives that fall well short of their goals. Instead of restoring confidence in the ability of government agencies to enforce antitrust laws effectively, a failed effort might merely reinforce doubts, and cynicism, about the quality of public administration.

This article analyzes important impediments that are likely, if not carefully addressed, to hamper the delivery of the current proposals to expand competition policy significantly and propose ways to overcome them. It commences in Part II by introducing the principal flaws that modern commentary attributes to U.S. antitrust policy (the “crisis in antirust”), before describing some of the proposals offered to bolster competition, strengthen antitrust policy, and restore its centrality as a tool of economic control. It also sketches how the federal and state agencies are responding to demands for more extensive intervention. As already explained, the purpose of this section is not to address the (respective) merits of these policy proposals but to identify the magnitude of the implementation challenges that the proposals for a major expansion of the U.S. antitrust program create.

#### 6---Ground---desirability of antitrust rulemaking is debated.

Rohit Chopra and Lina Khan 20. Rohit Chopra, Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission. And Lina M. Khan, Academic Fellow, Columbia Law School; Counsel, Subcommittee on Antitrust, Commercial, and Administrative Law, US House Committee on the Judiciary; former Legal Fellow, Federal Trade Commission. “The Case for "Unfair Methods of Competition" Rulemaking”. The University of Chicago Law Review , Vol. 87, No. 2 (March 2020), pp. 357-380. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26892415

Given that the FTC has largely neglected this tool, some may question the Commission’s authority to issue competition rules and the legal status these rules would have.54 Indeed, a common misconception is that this authority is extremely limited because FTC rulemaking is subject to the extensive hurdles posed by the Magnuson-Moss Warranty–Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act55 (“Magnuson-Moss”). In reality, Magnuson-Moss governs only rulemakings interpreting “unfair or deceptive acts or practices.”56 For rules interpreting “unfair methods of competition,” the FTC has authority to engage in participatory rulemaking pursuant to the APA. Several antitrust scholars have affirmed this authority, and the Appendix lays out further background on and discussion of it.57

Others acknowledge the authority exists but assert that antitrust law is ill suited for rulemaking because antitrust is a common law enterprise. It is true that, as a descriptive matter, antitrust enforcement has proceeded almost exclusively through adjudication.58 But the idea that this approach is normatively desirable is neither clear nor persuasive. Indeed, relying solely on adjudication has certainly not delivered a system with sufficient clarity, efficiency, or transparency.59

#### 2] Participation must be prior and considered---its key to legitimacy of rules and participation.

Rohit Chopra and Lina Khan 20. Rohit Chopra, Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission. And Lina M. Khan, Academic Fellow, Columbia Law School; Counsel, Subcommittee on Antitrust, Commercial, and Administrative Law, US House Committee on the Judiciary; former Legal Fellow, Federal Trade Commission. “The Case for "Unfair Methods of Competition" Rulemaking”. The University of Chicago Law Review , Vol. 87, No. 2 (March 2020), pp. 357-380. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26892415

And third, rulemaking would enable the Commission to establish rules through a transparent and participatory process, ensuring that everyone who may be affected by a new rule has the opportunity to weigh in on it, granting the rule greater legitimacy.49 APA procedures require that an agency provide the public with meaningful opportunity to comment on the rule’s content through the submission of written “data, views, or arguments.”50 The agency must then consider and address all submitted comments before issuing the final rule. If an agency adopts a rule without observing these procedures, a court may strike down the rule.51

This process is far more participatory than adjudication. Unlike judges, who are confined to the trial record when developing precedent-setting rules and standards, the Commission can put forth rules after considering a comprehensive set of information and analysis.52 Notably, this would also allow the FTC to draw on its own informational advantage—namely, its ability to collect and aggregate information and to study market trends and industry practices over the long term and outside the context of litigation.53 Drawing on this expertise to develop rules will help antitrust enforcement and policymaking better reflect empirical realities and better keep pace with evolving business practices.

#### 3] Admin law is precedent setting---genuine consultation now becomes inalienable---the plan and perm signal nullification is legitimate.

Giulio Napolitano 14. Professor of Administrative Law, Law Department, University of Roma Tre. "Conflicts and strategies in administrative law". OUP Academic. 8-1-2014. https://academic.oup.com/icon/article/12/2/357/710357

Conflicts in administrative law are not a single-battle war. Every move of an actor responds to the moves made by others. That’s why administrative law is a repeated interactions game. Each move is incremental and path-dependent. Devices and mechanisms set up in the previous round cannot be easily and fully dismantled.

Let’s take the example of independent authorities. Once they are established in order to insulate the implementation of specific policies from the influence of the government or from the pressure from local interests, it becomes difficult to abolish them: even when the rule-making power comes back into the hands of national legislators or executives. As a consequence, reactions must be fine-tuned and sophisticated. The preferred solutions will be, for instance, the transfer of a specific power from the regulatory agency to the executive, or the submission of some sensible prerogatives of the independent body to ex ante directives or ex post approval by a political actor.36

Further, procedural rights are difficult to withdraw: even more than organizational devices. Once they have been recognized, even if sometimes for purely instrumental reasons of fire-alarm signaling, they become sanctified as inalienable rights.37 That’s why adjustments and reactions must be interstitial: the right to be heard and other prerogatives of private actors cannot be nullified. Changing time limit for comments, enlarging or restricting addressees of participatory rights, shifting the burden of proof from the acting agency to private parties, and vice-versa, are among the most preferred solutions.

#### Perms sever the mandate of the plan---counterplan doesn’t fiat antitrust law but recommends a rule---process could result in no change---makes the affirmative conditional and a moving target.

[IF NOT READ YET]

Justia 21. "Notice and Comment Process for Agency Rulemaking". Updated: May 2021. Accessed: 8/26/2021. https://www.justia.com/administrative-law/rulemaking-writing-agency-regulations/notice-and-comment/

Agencies must consider all “relevant matter presented” during the comment period, and they must respond in some form to all comments received. They are not, however, required to take any specific action with regard to the rule itself. The publication of the final rule must include analyses of any relevant data or other materials submitted by the public and a justification of the form of the final rule in light of the comments the agency received.

If opposition to the proposed rule is exceptionally large or strident, the agency may decide to make substantial modifications and start the process over by publishing a new notice and opening a new comment period. Otherwise, the agency will publish its final findings along with the rule, which is codified in the Code of Federal Regulations.

#### 1---“Resolved”---means certain.

Webster’s Revised Dictionary 1996 ((1.) RESOLVED MEANS “HAVING A FIXED PURPOSE; DETERMINED; RESOLUTE”)

#### 2---Should is mandatory

Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division 1, Department D. 02. IN RE: the Marriage of Vanessa A. McNUTT, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Shane M. McNUTT, Respondent-Appellant. No. 1 CA-CV 01-0255. Decided: June 27, 2002 https://caselaw.findlaw.com/az-court-of-appeals/1315322.html

¶ 26 The word “should” is most commonly used to express obligation or duty.   See The American Heritage Dictionary 1670 (3d ed.1992).   We conclude that, based on the intent of the Guidelines and the interest of parents in the allocation of the federal tax exemption, the word “should” as used in § 25 of the Guidelines is mandatory rather than discretionary.   See Lincoln v. Lincoln, 155 Ariz. 272, 276, 746 P.2d 13, 17 (App.1987) (holding that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to allocate the dependency exemption).   Thus, the trial court abused its discretion by failing to allocate the federal tax exemption, and we direct the trial court to allocate the exemption on remand.

#### 3---“Substantial”---means full not merely possible.

Words & Phrases 64 (40 W&P 759)

The words “outward, open, actual, visible, substantial, and exclusive,” in connection with a change of possession, mean substantially the same thing. They mean not concealed; not hidden; exposed to view; free from concealment, dissimulation, reserve, or disguise; in full existence; denoting that which not merely can be, but is opposed to potential, apparent, constructive, and imaginary; veritable; genuine; certain; absolute; real at present time, as a matter of fact, not merely nominal; opposed to form; actually existing; true; not including admitting, or pertaining to any others; undivided; sole; opposed to inclusive.

#### 4---“Prohibitions”---eliminates all possibility that the activity is legal---the counterplan is a restriction.

PEDIAA 15. “Difference Between Prohibited and Restricted”. https://pediaa.com/difference-between-prohibited-and-restricted/

Main Difference – Prohibited vs. Restricted

Prohibited and Restricted are used in reference to limitations and prevention. However, they cannot be used interchangeably as there is a distinct difference between them. Prohibited is used when we are talking about an impossibility. Restricted is used when we are talking about something that has specific conditions. The main difference between prohibited and restricted is that prohibited means something is formally forbidden by law or authority whereas restricted means something is put under control or limits.

What Does Prohibited Mean

Prohibited is a variant of the verb prohibit. Prohibited can be taken as the past tense and past participle of prohibiting as well as an adjective. Prohibited means that something is formally forbidden by law or authority. When we say ‘smoking is prohibited’, it means that smoking is not allowed at all, there are no exceptions. Prohibit indicates an impossibility. This gives out the idea that it is not at all possible under any condition or circumstance. The term Prohibited goods is used to refer to items that are not allowed to enter or exit certain countries. For example, the government of South America lists Narcotic and habit-forming drugs in any form, Poison and other toxic substances, Fully automatic, military and unnumbered weapons, explosives and fireworks as prohibited goods. The following sentences will further explain the use of prohibited.

Inter-racial marriages were not prohibited by the government.

He was proved guilty of using prohibited substances.

No one was allowed to enter the grounds; entry was prohibited.

Prohibited imports are the items that are not allowed to enter a country.Difference Between Prohibited and Restricted

What Does Restricted Mean

Restrict means to put under limits or control. Restricted can be either used as the past tense of restrict or as an adjective meaning limited. When we say something is restricted, it means that limits or conditions have been added to it. It does not mean that it is completely impossible. For example, Restricted goods are allowed to enter or exit a country under certain circumstances. A written permission can help you to import or export that item. Likewise, a restricted area does not mean that people are not allowed to enter; it means that a special permission is required to enter the place. Restricted information refers to information that are not disclosed to the general public for security purposes.

The new regulations restricted the free movement of people.

The club was restricted to its members and their family members.

Only the highest military personnel had access to the restricted area.

American scientists had only restricted access to the area.Main difference - Prohibited vs Restricted

Difference Between Prohibited and Restricted

Meaning

Prohibited means banned or forbidden.

Restricted means limited in extent, number, scope, or action

Possibility

Prohibited means that there is no possibility of doing something.

Restricted means that something can be done under certain conditions.

Adjective

Prohibited functions as an adjective derived from prohibit.

Restricted functions as an adjective derived from restrict.

Past tense

Prohibited is the past tense and past participle of prohibit.

Restricted is the past tense and past participle of restrict.

#### Emboldened NoKo causes extinction.

Adam Mount 15, Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relation, “The Strategic Logic of Nuclear Restraint, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy”, Volume 57, Issue 4, 2015, p. 53-76

As things stand today, the most plausible scenario for US nuclear use is in a contingency on the Korean Peninsula. Though North Korea's nuclear programme is still primitive, steady effort over the last decades has yielded an appreciable nuclear capability. Public estimates suggest that the programme has accelerated since 2009: the regime now possesses the full nuclear fuel cycle, a nuclear arsenal comprising as many as 20 warheads, a rudimentary capability to produce warheads small enough to fit atop the country's sizeable ballistic-missile force, and even an effort to develop submarine-launched missiles.27 In the last few years, the military situation on the Korean Peninsula has looked relatively stable. However, both sides of the demilitarised zone (DMZ) remain on high alert. North Korea has retained its predilection for destabilising provocations, and although these have not been as severe as in previous years, they could still produce a spiral of mis-calculation that could quickly escalate to conflict.28 Imagine: the winter of 2018 has not gone well for North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. A weak harvest has caused declining readiness and increased desertion among the Korean People's Army (KPA) forces deployed in the country's north. Facing an internal challenge, the young dictator fears that his regime will not survive until summer. He calculates that a show of strength could shore up his regime, and develops a plan that he hopes will halt the annual joint US–South Korea exercises that begin in February. By escalating the military situation on the peninsula, he hopes to moderate the exercise, or at least to demonstrate defiance. As part of the effort, North Korea conducts a nuclear test in early February. KPA forces are alerted, and artillery units are shifted closer to the DMZ. Unfortunately, the South Korean president is struggling with a corruption scandal and has an incentive to show strength. Tensions escalate more quickly than expected, and soon units are exchanging artillery fire across the Northern Limit Line and sections of the DMZ. KPA units periodically cross the northern border of the DMZ near Seoul. The United States, anxious to demonstrate alliance cohesion, deploys a Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) to the demilitarised zone to supplement the rotational armoured brigade combat team then deployed with the Eighth Army in South Korea. A carrier strike group is stationed in the Sea of Japan, operating in conjunction with an amphibious group carrying elements of the third Marine Expeditionary Brigade deployed from Japan. The Air Force is conducting deterrent patrols with nuclear-capable B-52Hs up the eastern coast of the peninsula. More forces continue to flow into the theatre. At this stage, North Korea might decide to escalate to the nuclear level in an attempt to prevent full-scale contact between forces. For instance, a Scud or Nodong missile could detonate a 2-kiloton warhead 25 kilometres off the eastern end of the DMZ, between the Carrier Strike Group and the Korean coastline. Under this scenario, the blast would cause only limited casualties to aviation forces and the naval groups would soon recover operational status. Alternatively, the regime might only issue a nuclear threat while the United States continued to deploy forces into the region. Under this scenario, a US B-52H on deterrent patrol faces electronic interference and is fired upon by North Korean air-defence units. US forces ramp up their intelligence-collection efforts against the air-defence networks, but also North Korea's road-mobile nuclear forces, using stealthy unmanned aerial vehicles, signals intelligence and special-operations forces. North Korean officials alert their leadership that US cyber forces have penetrated their command, control and communications networks, though they have not yet damaged the system. Concerned that their nuclear forces are vulnerable to a first strike and anxious to forestall the deployment of additional ground units, North Korean leaders decide to launch a nuclear-armed Nodong ballistic missile at Kadena Air Base on Okinawa. The strike kills nearly 20,000 American citizens and many more Japanese civilians who live near the base. If the regime instead opted to withhold nuclear use until later, the military situation could deteriorate further still. Let us imagine that in retaliation for US airstrikes against certain aggressive anti-ship missile units on the eastern coast – strikes which the DPRK claim caused civilian casualties – North Korean artillery north of the DMZ have shelled Seoul. Having achieved a favourable correlation of forces, the US–South Korean combined command orders a limited expeditionary force to attempt to clear the northern border of the DMZ of artillery units. US and South Korean ground-attack fighters suppress enemy air defences along the length of the DMZ and the southern half of the eastern coastline, and a mechanised brigade begins to advance across the DMZ. Concerned they are facing an invasion, the North Korean leadership conducts a nuclear strike against allied forces crossing the DMZ. The immediate casualties from the nuclear blast are military, but a cloud of fallout drifts toward Seoul. Though these scenarios for nuclear strikes vary significantly, US interests in each case would be similar. The United States would act to prevent further nuclear attacks; to deny North Korea any advantages from nuclear use; to resolve the crisis in a manner favourable to US allies; and to ensure that the global community expressed strict disapproval of the first strike, both to punish North Korea for its actions and to attempt to recover the nuclear taboo. In the aftermath of a nuclear attack, the first three interests might well lead US and ROK officials to determine that the North Korean regime cannot be allowed to remain in power. If so, the combined command would have to mount an invasion of the North. Allied aircraft would suppress enemy air defences, ground forces would advance along the peninsula from south to north, while amphibious forces attacked from the Sea of Japan, and special-operations forces attempted to secure North Korean weapons of mass destruction and critical leadership targets. The invasion would be difficult and risky, but would be likely eventually to succeed.29 Prior to launching an invasion, however, US policymakers would have to make a decision on whether to employ nuclear weapons in response to North Korea's first use. There are three likely options:30 a nonlethal demonstration shot; a counterforce nuclear strike against the North's nuclear forces; and a nuclear strike against the North's conventional forces.31 A demonstration would be the likeliest nuclear response to the first scenario, a North Korean demonstration. Because a lethal retaliation for a demonstration response would violate the standing employment guidance, which promises to ‘apply the principles of distinction and proportionality and seek to minimize collateral damage to civilian populations and civilian objects’, US officials might judge this to be the best retaliatory option.32 The reasoning behind issuing a reciprocal demonstration would be for the United States to match the DPRK's demonstration of resolve and willingness to escalate to the nuclear level. The hope in this case would be that, seeing that US policymakers were willing to employ nuclear weapons, North Korea would eschew further nuclear use. However, the US demonstration strike would not achieve tactical military objectives and it would be devastating to the systemic interests listed above. After an exchange of demonstration strikes, the global community would certainly condemn the DPRK shot – but the United States would have difficulty avoiding similar disapprobation. A reciprocal demonstration shot would also do little to resolve the crisis in a favourable way. It would provide no tactical advantage, dilute international pressure on the North (especially from China) and leave intact the incentives that caused the DPRK to escalate in the first place. Having affirmed that the nuclear threshold could be breached, North Korea would be able to credibly threaten more damaging strikes later. Meanwhile, the exchange would have done little to drive back KPA forces, and invasion would be more difficult than before the exchange took place, owing to the difficulty of operating in a contaminated environment. The United States could instead use nuclear weapons as part of a counterforce strike to destroy the North Korean nuclear arsenal before it could be launched. This would be most proportional in response to the second scenario, a strike on Okinawa. With an arsenal as small, inaccurate and constrained as North Korea's, the United States would have a reasonable chance of limiting damage from a future attack. The primary problem with a nuclear counterforce strike, however, is that it would entail the use of multiple nuclear warheads in response to a single shot, signalling a major escalation of the nuclear war. Because North Korea's 20 warheads would have to be struck simultaneously, and their location would not be certain, the counterforce operation would likely require the United States to employ several SLBMs. Moreover, these ballistic trajectories would likely alert Russian and possibly also Chinese forces. With tensions high in the region and US expeditionary forces operating in close proximity to the borders of each country, the potential for misunderstanding would be significant. A nuclear counterforce strike would cause massive destruction in North Korea. A cloud of fallout would cover the peninsula and, depending on wind patterns, large parts of Russia, China and Japan. In addition to hundreds of thousands of North Korean casualties, the strikes would cause widespread radiation poisoning in South Korea and neighbouring countries. An invasion of North Korea would be all but impossible.